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INTRODUCTION 
 Most lawyers are competent, diligent, and honest. No lawyer is immune to 
error, however, and some are guilty of serious misjudgments. When lawyers 
allegedly err in the course of clients’ representations, or, worse, allegedly en-
gage in deliberate misconduct, aggrieved clients may sue for professional neg-
ligence, commonly described as legal malpractice, or for breach of fiduciary 
duty.1 A lawyer who treats a client dishonestly may face liability on either of 
                                                        
*  Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., University of Kan-
sas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska, B.S., Fort Hayes University. The opinions expressed 
here are the author’s alone. 
1  Liability for legal malpractice generally requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship, giving rise to a duty of care on the lawyer’s part, breach of that 
duty, proximate cause, and damages. In re Estate of Powell, 12 N.E.3d 14, 19 (Ill. 2014); 
Sabin v. Ackerman, 846 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2014); Harris v. O’Connor, 842 N.W.2d 50, 
54 (Neb. 2014). Breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice generally are separate causes 
of action. Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 72 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Stanley 
v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1995)). The elements of the causes of ac-
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these theories.2 Lawyers’ alleged dishonesty in their practices exposes them to 
potential liability to third parties as well. For example, if a lawyer knowingly 
and substantially assists or encourages a client’s wrongdoing, those who are 
harmed by the client’s misconduct may sue the lawyer in tort for allegedly aid-
ing and abetting the client’s misdeeds.3 Yet, while the potential consequences 
of lawyers’ alleged dishonesty should be apparent, lawyers seldom consider 
themselves at risk for liability based on fraud or misrepresentation arising out 
of clients’ representations. This perspective probably traces, at least in part, to 
common notions of litigation practice, where parties generally cannot base 
fraud claims on opposing lawyers’ misrepresentations.4 Any comfort lawyers 
derive from this impression, however, overlooks three key points. First, lawyers 
may be sued for fraud or negligent misrepresentation by adversaries in litiga-
tion, as where, for example, they are alleged to have knowingly misrepresented 
material facts in negotiations.5 Second, transactional practice is such that busi-
ness lawyers are natural targets of fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims 
by third parties based on alleged false statements and failures to disclose infor-
                                                                                                                                 
tion, however, are similar. Liability for breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff to prove 
“ ‘(1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage 
proximately caused by the breach.’ ” Id. (quoting Stanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776); see also 
Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786, 792–93 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Koger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000)). Some states distinguish between legal malpractice claims based on alleged profes-
sional negligence, or a breach of the standard of care, and an alleged breach of fiduciary du-
ty, sometimes described as a breach of the standard of conduct. See, e.g., Crist v. Loyacono, 
65 So. 3d 837, 842 (Miss. 2011) (employing this terminology). Other states merge the causes 
of action where the lawyer’s alleged misstep is both a breach of the standard of care and a 
breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (“If 
the alleged breach can be characterized as both a breach of the standard of care (legal mal-
practice based on negligence) and a breach of a fiduciary obligation (constructive fraud), 
then the sole claim is legal malpractice.”). 
2  See, e.g., Charnay v. Cobert, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480–81, 481 n.12 (Ct. App. 2006) (stat-
ing that “billing for work not performed or performed by others with lower billing rates than 
those charged constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty”); Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d 
75, 84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“[A]n attorney who undertakes representation of a client owes 
that client both a duty of competent representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity, 
and confidentiality. An intentional misrepresentation to a client during any transaction where 
an attorney represents that client is clearly a violation of that attorney’s duty of honesty.”) 
(citation omitted). 
3  See Frederico v. Maric, 226 P.3d 403, 405 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (listing elements of the 
tort of aiding and abetting); Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 649 n.12 (Wis. 2009) 
(same). See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Cli-
ents’ Misconduct Under State Law, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 130 (2008) (exploring aiding and 
abetting claims against lawyers). 
4  Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Ariz. 2005). 
5  See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y., 614 F.2d 301, 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (reasoning 
that jury reasonably could have found lawyer liable for fraud under New York law for mis-
representing the amount of insurance coverage available to settle the plaintiff’s medical mal-
practice claim). 
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mation.6 Third, clients may sue their own lawyers for alleged fraud and misrep-
resentation in appropriate cases.7 
 In fact, fraud and misrepresentation are common theories of liability in 
suits against lawyers by both clients and third parties.8 In 2012, for example, 
the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP suffered a $12.6 million 
judgment after a jury found the firm and one of its partners, Harvey Cohen, lia-
ble for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.9 Cohen had represented Douglas 
Machine & Tool Co. in its sale to TurboCombustor Technology Inc.10 He al-
legedly knew of a Douglas Machine shareholder dispute that substantially low-
ered the company’s value but he did not disclose the dispute to TurboCombus-
tor in connection with the sale.11 TurboCombustor alleged that it would not 
have purchased Douglas Machine had it known of the shareholder dispute.12 In 
addition to awarding compensatory damages, the jury found that Dinsmore & 
Shohl was liable for punitive damages, but that aspect of the case was bifurcat-
                                                        
6  See, e.g., Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938–40 (W.D. Mo. 
2014) (permitting the plaintiff to pursue a negligent misrepresentation claim against a law 
firm for allegedly false statements in a bond offering); Farmers State Bank v. Huguenin, 469 
S.E.2d 34, 36–37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for lawyer on bank’s 
claim that lawyer for borrower failed to disclose cloud on title to real estate to be used to se-
cure loan); Taylor v. Riley, 336 P.3d 256, 272 (Idaho 2014) (permitting non-client’s suit 
against lawyer based on allegedly false statements in an opinion letter); Hansen v. Anderson, 
Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 827 (Iowa 2001) (permitting lawyer to sue 
opposing counsel for indemnity based on falsified documents presented during the sale of a 
business); Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. Civ.A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 3019442, at 
*11–21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004) (concluding that a law firm committed negligent 
misrepresentation in issuing an opinion letter); JJJJ Walker, LLC v. Yollick, 447 S.W.3d 
453, 459–73 (Tex. App. 2014) (concluding that a lawyer could be liable for fraud while act-
ing as a bank’s agent). 
7  See, e.g., Bryant v. Robledo, 938 So. 2d 413, 419 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (permitting fraud 
claim against lawyer for lawyer’s attempt to obtain fees to represent an incompetent client); 
Ratcliff v. Boydell, 674 So. 2d 272, 280 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that lawyer de-
frauded client by inflating value of structured settlement to obtain an excessive contingent 
fee); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCabe & Mack, LLP, 964 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2013) 
(holding that client stated fraud claim by alleging that lawyers said they had filed a motion 
for default judgment when they had not done so and billed the client for preparing the phan-
tom motion). 
8  See RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:31 (2015 
ed.) (“Fraud is a common claim, easy to allege, and often accompanied by other theories.”). 
9  Jon Newberry, Law Firm Dinsmore & Shohl Hit with $12.6 Million Judgement, 
CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Oct. 26, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati 
/blog/2012/10/law-firm-dinsmore-shohl-hit-with.html; Nate Raymond, Dinsmore Hit with 
$12.6 Mln Fraud Verdict, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreu 
ters.com/Legal/News/2012/10_October/Dinsmore_hit_with_$12.6_mln_fraud_verdict. 
10  Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9. 
11  Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9. 
12  Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9 (reporting TurboCombustor’s claim that 
the undisclosed shareholders’ dispute lowered Douglas Machine’s value from $19 million to 
$4 million). 
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ed, and the firm confidentially settled with TurboCombustor before the jury 
could reconvene to weigh punitive damages.13 
 Fraud and misrepresentation claims pose an array of challenges for targeted 
law firms and lawyers. Fraud claims may support punitive damage awards in 
cases where punitives would not otherwise be recoverable, or open the door to 
discovery that a court might refuse if only the lawyer’s professional negligence 
was in dispute.14 Because the presence of fraud normally is a question of fact,15 
well-pleaded fraud claims are difficult for defendants to defeat at the motion to 
dismiss stage. Similarly, “[a] claim for negligent misrepresentation is ordinarily 
one for a jury, unless the undisputed facts are so clear as to permit only one 
conclusion,”16 thus devaluing a motion to dismiss as a defense tactic in many 
cases. Again, because fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are fact-
intensive,17 a plaintiff may be able to avoid summary judgment, and by forcing 
the defendant to contemplate the risk of trial, achieve a favorable settlement. 
Fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are particularly valuable to plain-
tiffs who cannot establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship with a 
lawyer-defendant because they avoid the general requirement of privity for lia-
bility based on professional negligence.18 First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod 
Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A.,19 is an illustrative case. 
 First Arkansas arose out of a failed attempt by a limited liability company 
known as Dream Team to develop a residential subdivision called Belclaire.20 
Dream Team formed a municipal improvement district to issue tax-free munic-
ipal bonds to finance streets, sewers, and other public improvements in 
                                                        
13  Kimball Perry, Dinsmore Settles Second Half of $12.6M Suit, CINCINNATI.COM (Nov. 26, 
2012, 3:35 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/article/20121126/news0107/311260075. 
14  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is 
also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”); 1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 
8, § 23:6 (explaining that fraud is separate from legal malpractice and that the fraud is usual-
ly alleged to support a claim for punitive damages). 
15  Chism v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 780, 787 (Kan. 2010); Croslin v. Enerlex, Inc., 
308 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Okla. 2013). 
16  Nota Constr. Corp. v. Keyes Assocs., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
17  See St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 55 A.3d 443, 447 (Me. 2012) (“Whether a 
party made a misrepresentation and whether the opposing party justifiably relied on a mis-
representation are questions of fact.”). 
18  See, e.g., Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert LLP, 934 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121–22 (App. Div. 
2011) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ professional negligence claim failed for a lack of privi-
ty but finding that the plaintiffs could maintain a negligent misrepresentation claim against 
the law firm based on relationship of near-privity before exonerating the firm); Ginsburg 
Dev. Cos., LLC v. Carbone, 926 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157–58 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that legal 
malpractice allegations predicated on fraud avoid the privity requirement); Credit Union 
Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1271 (R.I. 2009) (“Fraud is a well-settled exception to 
the privity requirement that historically bars nonclient recovery for attorney malpractice.”). 
19  427 S.W.3d 47 (Ark. 2013). 
20  Id. at 49. 
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Belclaire.21 The district hired Christopher Travis of the Gill law firm as bond 
counsel. Travis prepared the preliminary official statement (“POS”) and official 
statement (“OS”) that were provided to the underwriter, American Municipal 
Securities, Inc. (“AMS”), for use in marketing the bonds.22 The district issued 
two series of bonds, Series A and Series B. The Series B bonds were backed by 
a mortgage on land in Belclaire that Dream Team owned and by capital use im-
provement fees that Dream Team was to collect.23 The POS and OS did not 
identify a prior mortgage held by First Federal Bank securing the loan used to 
purchase the land for Belclaire.24 AMS sold the Series B bonds to Arkansas 
Banker’s Bank, which retained some and sold the remainder to other banks.25 
 Dream Team defaulted on payment of the capital use improvement fees 
and on the First Federal mortgage.26 The banks that purchased the Series B 
bonds sued the Gill firm for legal malpractice, violations of the Arkansas Secu-
rities Act, and fraud. They alleged that Travis failed to disclose in the bond of-
fering that the First Federal mortgage was superior to the lien created by the 
capital improvement use fees obligation.27 The priority of the First Federal 
mortgage allegedly devalued the banks’ Series B bonds.28 The Gill firm ob-
tained summary judgment on all counts and the banks appealed to the Arkansas 
Supreme Court.29 
 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the Gill firm 
on the plaintiffs’ Arkansas Securities Act claims because the Gill firm was not 
a seller of the bonds, did not control their sale, and did not materially aid in 
their sale as required for liability under the Arkansas statute.30 The court also 
affirmed summary judgment for the Gill firm on the plaintiffs’ legal malprac-
tice claim based on a lack of privity because the Gill firm was retained by the 
district and had no attorney-client relationship with any of the plaintiffs.31 
 That left the plaintiffs’ fraud claim, because the Arkansas lawyer-immunity 
statute requiring privity for legal malpractice liability contained an exception 
for acts or omissions by lawyers constituting fraud or intentional misrepresenta-
tions.32 The court began its analysis by stating that to prove fraud, a plaintiff 
had to show that: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact; 
(2) the defendant knew the representation was false or that there was insuffi-
                                                        
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 50. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at 51–54. 
25  Id. at 50. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. at 51–52. 
31  Id. at 52–53. 
32  Id. at 53 (quoting McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Ark. 1999)). 
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cient evidence upon which to make the representation; (3) the defendant in-
tended to induce action or inaction by the plaintiff in reliance upon the repre-
sentation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the 
plaintiff was damaged as a result.33 
 Here, the Gill firm admitted that it knew of the First Federal mortgage, but 
argued that given the structure of the transaction, the mortgage was not infor-
mation that might have assisted prospective purchasers in evaluating the risks 
of buying the bonds and, therefore, was not a material fact that had to be dis-
closed in the POS or the OS.34 Conversely, the plaintiffs asserted that: (1) the 
priority of the mortgage was material and, thus, the Gill firm had a duty to dis-
close it; (2) the Gill firm intentionally failed to disclose the First Federal mort-
gage and that had the mortgage been disclosed, the bond issue would not have 
closed; and (3) the Gill firm’s failure to disclose the mortgage was done with 
the intent to defraud purchasers of the bonds so as to secure the fees the Gill 
firm expected to realize from the bond issue.35 The plaintiffs’ critical point was 
that genuine issues of material fact remained, and thus the trial court erred by 
awarding summary judgment to the Gill firm on the fraud claim.36 The First 
Arkansas court agreed with the plaintiffs, reversed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the fraud count, and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.37 
 First Arkansas illuminates lawyers’ vulnerability to misrepresentation 
claims and the difficulty they may encounter in defeating them short of trial. It 
therefore nicely launches our examination of lawyers’ and law firms’ potential 
civil liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Looking ahead, Part I 
of this article provides an overview of the common law causes of action availa-
ble to potential plaintiffs: (a) common law fraud, also described as actual fraud 
or intentional misrepresentation; (b) fraudulent concealment; (c) constructive 
fraud; and (d) negligent misrepresentation.38 After discussing these causes of 
action, Part I examines the role that rules of professional conduct play in estab-
lishing a standard of care or conduct, or the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reli-
                                                        
33  Id. at 53–54. 
34  Id. at 54. According to the Gill firm, if the Arkansas municipal improvement district stat-
ute is followed, any mortgages are subordinate to liens arising from related bonds. Thus, the 
mortgage did not have to be disclosed because amounts due on the bonds from landowners 
would have created a lien superior to the mortgage. This argument failed because genuine 
issues of material fact remained in dispute. Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 54–55. 
38  This article does not discuss lawyers’ civil liability under attorney deceit statutes. See, 
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-2-17 (West 2010) (“If an attorney is guilty of deceit or collusion 
or consents thereto with intent to deceive the court, judge or party, he shall forfeit to the in-
jured party, treble damages to be recovered in a civil action . . . .”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 487 
(McKinney 2005) (subjecting a lawyer who “[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or con-
sents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party” to treble dam-
ages). 
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ance on a lawyer’s alleged misrepresentations. Part II looks at four illustrative 
negligent misrepresentation and fraud cases against lawyers; two arising out of 
underlying litigation matters and two arising out of lawyers’ transactional prac-
tices. Part III offers lawyers some brief practical advice on avoiding potential 
liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
I. UNDERSTANDING FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION 
Plaintiffs suing lawyers or law firms for alleged misrepresentations or 
omissions may pursue several theories of recovery, including: (a) common law 
fraud, also referred to as actual fraud or intentional misrepresentation; (b) 
fraudulent concealment, also described as fraud by silence or silent fraud; (c) 
constructive fraud; and (d) negligent misrepresentation. Depending on the case 
and cause of action, plaintiffs may attempt to use rules of professional conduct 
to define the standard of care or conduct against which a defendant’s duty is 
measured, or establish key elements required for liability. 
A. Common Law Fraud 
As a California court once observed, “[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no 
different from a fraud claim against anyone else.”39 The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts explains liability for common law fraud as follows: 
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or 
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reli-
ance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused 
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.40 
A misrepresentation may be either oral or written.41 
Under the Restatement approach, a listener’s reliance on a misrepresenta-
tion is justifiable only if the matter misrepresented is material.42 Many courts 
that generally follow the Restatement, however, treat materiality as an element 
separate from reliance.43 Either way, a matter is deemed to be material if (1) a 
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or absence in de-
termining how or whether to act in the subject transaction; or (2) the maker 
knows or has reason to know that the recipient regards or is likely to regard the 
matter as important in determining a course of action even though a reasonable 
person would not so consider it.44 
With respect to justifiable or reasonable reliance, the person to whom a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is made is generally entitled to rely on the misrep-
resentation even if she might have learned that it was false through investiga-
                                                        
39  Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Ct. App. 2004). 
40  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
41  Freedman v. Brutzkus, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2010). 
42  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
43  See infra notes 50–51, 54–56. 
44  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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tion.45 As a rule, a party has no duty to investigate the truthfulness of a repre-
sentation and may justifiably or reasonably rely on a representation so long as 
the party does not know it to be false or it is not obviously false.46 
The base question, of course, is what makes a misrepresentation fraudu-
lent? Section 526 explains that a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker: 
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not 
have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or im-
plies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he 
states or implies.47  
Courts frequently describe this element of a defendant’s conduct as scienter.48 
The maker’s scienter is critical to a finding of fraud.49 The existence of scienter 
is a question of fact.50 
Common law fraud has no all-encompassing or uniform definition or de-
scription.51 A cause of action for fraud certainly has essential elements as out-
lined in section 525, although some jurisdictions that have embraced the Re-
statement describe or list those elements in different ways. For example, Idaho 
courts hold that fraud has nine elements: 
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker’s intent that there be reliance; 
(6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the 
hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.52 
                                                        
45  Id. § 541. 
46  Donner v. Nicklaus, 778 F.3d 857, 870 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Utah law); 
Yazdianpour v. Safeblood Techs., Inc., 779 F.3d 530, 536–37 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Ar-
kansas law and distinguishing affirmative misrepresentations from failures to disclose); Hoyt 
Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2007). See also Jane 
Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d 680, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining 
that “a party is under no duty to investigate a fraud it has no reason to suspect”). Cf. Special-
ty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(explaining that fraud does not include a justifiable reliance element because a hearer may 
rely on the truth of a representation even if the falsity of the representation could have been 
discovered through reasonable investigation). 
47  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
48  See, e.g., Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2012) (“The knowledge of falsity element 
of a fraud claim is also commonly known as the scienter element.”). 
49  Butler v. Harris, 13 N.E.3d 380, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Weston v. Northampton Person-
al Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). 
50  Meecorp Capital Mkts., LLC v. PSC of Two Harbors, LLC, 776 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 
2015) (applying Minnesota law). 
51  Mancuso v. Burton Farm Dev. Co. LLC, 748 S.E.2d 738, 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quot-
ing Forbis v. Neal, 649 S.E.2d 382, 387 (N.C. 2007)); Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 342 
(Tenn. 2012). 
52  April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 328 P.3d 480, 489 (Idaho 2014) (quoting Bank of 
Commerce v. Jefferson Enters., LLC, 303 P.3d 183, 192 (Idaho 2013)). 
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Mississippi, Missouri, Utah, and Washington courts also list nine elements and 
describe them similarly.53 
Other jurisdictions reduce a cause of action for common law fraud to four, 
five, or six elements. Connecticut, for example, lists four elements: “(1) a false 
representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue 
and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of 
inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his 
detriment.”54 Florida similarly lists four elements.55 Alaska, California, Dela-
ware, Illinois, and New York courts, among others, identify five elements, 
which, while varying slightly in description, generally are: (1) misrepresenta-
tion of an existing material fact; (2) made with knowledge of its falsity; (3) the 
speaker’s intent that the listener rely on the statement; (4) justifiable reliance by 
the listener; and (5) resulting damages.56 Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebras-
ka, Pennsylvania, and Texas consider common law fraud to have six ele-
ments.57 With slight variation, those states require proof that: (1) the defendant 
made a material representation; (2) the representation was false; (3) the repre-
sentation was known to be false or was recklessly made; (4) the representation 
was intended to induce the plaintiff to act; (5) the plaintiff relied on the misrep-
resentation; and (6) the plaintiff was damaged as a result.58 
                                                        
53  See, e.g., Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., 142 So. 3d 407, 418 (Miss. 2014) 
(quoting Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 831 (Miss. 2009)); Stander v. 
Szabados, 407 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Carlton v. Brown, 323 P.3d 571, 581–82 
(Utah 2014) (quoting Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d 966, 977 n.38 (Utah 
2009)); Alexander v. Sanford, 325 P.3d 341, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Stiley v. 
Block, 925 P.2d 194, 204 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)). 
54  Reville v. Reville, 93 A.3d 1076, 1087 (Conn. 2014) (quoting Weinstein v. Weinstein, 
882 A.2d 53, 63 (Conn. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55  Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 595 n.2 (Fla. 2013). 
56  Taylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 301 P.3d 182, 191 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Asher v. 
Alkan Shelter, LLC, 212 P.3d 772, 782 (Alaska 2009)); State ex rel. Wilson v. Super. Ct., 
174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 333 n.21 (Ct. App. 2014) (describing the tort of “deceit”); Vichi v. 
Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 773 (Del. Ch. 2014); Bonhomme v. St. 
James, 970 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2012); Neckles Builders, Inc. v. Turner, 986 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 
(App. Div. 2014) (quoting Introna v. Huntington Learning Ctrs., Inc., 911 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 
(App. Div. 2010)). 
57  Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 335 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Lawyers Title 
Ins. Corp. v. Pokraka, 595 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Ind. 1992)); Elendt v. Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC, 443 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014); Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 152 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013); Bott v. Holman, 850 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014); Weston 
v. Northampton Pers. Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (quoting Heritage 
Surveyors & Eng’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Penn Bank, 801 A.2d 1248, 1250–51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002)); Landers v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 434 S.W.3d 291, 293–94 (Tex. App. 2014) 
(quoting Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. App. 
2009)). 
58  Kesling, 997 N.E.2d at 335 (quoting Lawyers Title, 595 N.E.2d at 249); Giddings & Lew-
is, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 747 (Ky. 2011); Lucas, 830 N.W.2d at 152; 
Bott, 850 N.W.2d at 807; Weston, 62 A.3d at 960 (quoting Heritage Surveyors & Eng’rs, 
Inc., 801 A.2d at 1250–51); Landers, 434 S.W.3d at 293–94 (quoting Aquaplex, Inc., 297 
S.W.3d at 774). 
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Some aspects of common law fraud transcend jurisdictional boundaries but 
reduce to the principle that the cause of action is disfavored. First, outside the 
context of constructive fraud,59 fraud is never presumed,60 nor is it lightly in-
ferred.61 To the contrary, courts presume a defendant’s honesty and inno-
cence.62 Second, plaintiffs generally must plead fraud with particularity.63 A 
plaintiff’s failure to specifically plead in her complaint or petition the acts or 
facts allegedly evidencing fraud generally justifies dismissal of the case.64 
Third, plaintiffs typically must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.65 
“Clear and convincing evidence is such a high standard that even the over-
                                                        
59  See infra Part II.C. 
60  Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 343 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. S. Med. Ass’n, 547 
So. 2d 510, 514 (Ala. 1989)); Slaick v. Arnold, 728 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); 
Fisher v. Grove Farm Co., Inc., 230 P.3d 382, 403 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Shoppe v. 
Gucci Am., Inc., 14 P.3d 1049, 1067 (Haw. 2000)); Chism v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 234 
P.3d 780, 787 (Kan. 2010); Harmony Glob. Sourcing, LLC v. Stigliano, No. L-003621-05, 
2009 WL 2461262, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2009); Anderson v. Zimbel-
man, 842 N.W.2d 852, 857 (N.D. 2014) (quoting First Union Nat’l Bank v. RPB 2, LLC, 
674 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 2004)); Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Okla. 2009); Law 
Capital, Inc. v. Kettering, 836 N.W.2d 642, 647 (S.D. 2013); Homestead Grp., LLC. v. Bank 
of Tenn., 307 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Priddy v. Rawson, 282 S.W.3d 588, 
598 (Tex. App. 2009); White v. Shane Edeburn Constr., LLC, 285 P.3d 949, 957 (Wyo. 
2012) (quoting Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1994)). 
61  Law Capital, Inc., 836 N.W.2d at 647. 
62  Bowens v. Allied Warehousing Servs., Inc., 729 S.E.2d 845, 851–52 (W. Va. 2012) (quot-
ing Hunt v. Hunt, 114 S.E. 283, 285 (W. Va. 1922)); White, 285 P.3d at 957 (quoting Os-
born, 870 P.2d at 383). 
63  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). 
64  See, e.g., Decker v. Nagel Rice LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9878(SAS), 2010 WL 2346608, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010) (dismissing client’s fraud claim against lawyer for failure to plead 
facts allegedly constituting fraud with particularity). 
65  See, e.g., In re Estate of Nethken, 978 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C. 2009); Frontier Dev. Grp., 
LLC v. Caravella, 338 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Idaho 2014); Hanson-Suminksi v. Rohrman Mid-
west Motors, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 194, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Chism, 234 P.3d at 787; Barr v. 
Dyke, 49 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Me. 2012); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ray, 997 So. 2d 983, 991 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Hamilton v. McGill, 352 So. 2d 825, 831 (Miss. 1977)); 
Stander v. Szabados, 407 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Kempton v. Dugan, 
224 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)); Bott v. Holman, 850 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Neb. Ct. 
App. 2014); Harmony Glob. Sourcing, LLC, 2009 WL 2461262, at *3; Anderson, 842 
N.W.2d at 857 (quoting First Union Nat’l Bank, 674 N.W.2d at 8); Bowman, 212 P.3d at 
1218; Rohm & Haas Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1179 (Pa. 2001); In re Estate of 
Alden v. Dee, 35 A.3d 950, 961 (Vt. 2011); Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640, 
653 (W. Va. 2012); White, 285 P.3d at 957 (quoting Osborn, 870 P.2d at 383). But see Ben-
ton v. Clay, 123 So. 3d 212, 219 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that fraud need only be proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence); Sejnoha v. City of Yankton, 622 N.W.2d 735, 739 
(S.D. 2001) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to fraud). 
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whelming weight of the evidence does not rise to the same level.”66 Fourth, the 
failure of any one element of the cause of action will defeat a fraud claim.67 
 When considering lawyers’ potential liability for fraud, perhaps the most 
surprising thing is the Restatement’s position that fraud may be predicated on a 
statement of opinion.68 Indeed, even a cursory review of case law will reveal 
ample recent authority holding that a statement of opinion will not support a 
cause of action for fraud.69 Merrilees v. Merrilees70 illustrates this principle in 
the context of law practice.  
 Merrilees arose out of the divorce of Robert and Pamela Merrilees, which 
began in 2005. In 1999, Robert had formed Spot Trading LLC (“Spot”).71 Al-
though the Merrilees were married in 1993, Robert argued in the dissolution 
proceedings that Spot was not marital property and further asserted that his dis-
tributions from Spot adequately compensated the marital estate.72 In 2009, the 
Merrilees negotiated a marital settlement agreement that (a) allocated to Pamela 
$18 million and the couple’s $1 million home, tax free; and (b) allocated Spot 
to Robert.73 The agreement recited that the Merrilees had disputed Spot’s value, 
but stated that Pamela had been advised by her own expert on Spot’s value, 
stated that she was satisfied with that valuation, and provided that she dis-
claimed any interest in Spot.74 The trial court approved the agreement and in-
corporated it into the judgment for dissolution of the marriage.75 
 In 2010, Pamela sued Robert and his lawyers on various theories, including 
fraud, alleging that they had understated Spot’s value and falsely informed her 
that Spot was not marital property.76 Her fraud claim rested on three documents 
that Robert’s lawyers gave her in the divorce case: an asset list, a memorandum 
                                                        
66  Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969, 975 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). 
67  Nash v. Studdard, 670 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Butler v. Terminix 
Int’l, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)); Morgan Stanley Credit Corp. v. Fill-
inger, 979 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 762 S.E.2d 54, 68 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 691 S.E.2d 135, 149 
(S.C. 2010)); Parsons v. Greenberg, No. 02-10-00131-CV, 2012 WL 310505, at *10 (Tex. 
App. Feb. 2, 2012); In re Estate of Alden, 35 A.3d 950, 961 (Vt. 2011). 
68  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
69  See, e.g., RHA Constr., Inc. v. Scott Eng’g, Inc., C.A. N11C-03-013 JRJ CCLD, 2013 
WL 3884937, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013); Burds v. Hipes, 763 S.E.2d 887, 889 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Ill. Non-Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass’n v. Human Serv. Ctr. of S. Metro-East, 
884 N.E.2d 700, 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Flegles, Inc. v. TruServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544, 
549 (Ky. 2009) (quoting McHargue v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co., 283 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Ky. 
1955)); Lasater v. Guttmann, 5 A.3d 79, 103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Heath v. Palmer, 
915 A.2d 1290, 1296 (Vt. 2006); Sales v. Kecoughtan Housing Co., Ltd., 690 S.E.2d 91, 94 
(Va. 2010). 
70  Merrilees v. Merrilees, 998 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
71  Id. at 153. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 153–54. 
74  Id. at 154. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
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explaining Robert’s position, and a flow chart.77 The trial court dismissed her 
case in its entirety and she fared just as badly on appeal.78 The appellate court 
easily dispatched her fraud claim, first reasoning that the allegedly false docu-
ments “were expressions of opinion and were given to support Robert’s posi-
tions during settlement negotiations in the divorce case.”79 Because she could 
“not identify any misstatements of material fact on which she reasonably re-
lied,” the Merrilees court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Rob-
ert’s lawyers.80 
The plaintiff’s fraud claim also failed in Cain v. Osman.81 The lawyer in 
that case, Ronald Osman, declined to pursue a qui tam action against General 
American Life Insurance Co. on behalf of a podiatrist, John Cain, telling Cain 
that he “did not believe” Cain had “a viable action under the False Claims 
Act.”82 Then, a few months later, Osman sued General American for similar 
misconduct on behalf of two other relators, Harry and Nancy Riggs, and the 
three of them were rewarded when the government intervened in the action and 
obtained a $70 million settlement.83 An outraged Cain sued Osman on various 
theories, including fraud, alleging that Osman had used information he provid-
ed to pursue the Riggs’ case.84 The district court dismissed the case and Cain 
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.85 
 Cain contended that the district court had erred in dismissing his fraud 
claim by not recognizing that he had alleged a false statement of material fact: 
Osman’s representation that he did not believe that Cain had a “viable action 
under the False Claims Act.”86 The Seventh Circuit rejected Cain’s argument 
on the basis that in declining to represent him, Osman had offered “a legal 
opinion, not a representation of fact.”87 In the end, the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s judgment for Osman across the board.88 
 Notwithstanding the results in Merrilees and Cain, the general rule that 
mere statements of opinion and statements of legal opinion will not support 
fraud allegations is subject to several qualifications or exceptions. First, the 
general rule may not apply because what is claimed to be a statement of opin-
                                                        
77  Id. at 158. 
78  Id. at 153. 
79  Id. at 158. 
80  Id. at 159. 
81  Cain v. Osman, 286 F. App’x 934 (7th Cir. 2008). 
82  Id. at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 938. 
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ion may actually be a misrepresentation of fact.89 “A fact is something ‘suscep-
tible of knowledge.’ ”90 For example, while “a representation of law is a state-
ment of opinion as to what the law permits or prohibits” and will not support a 
fraud claim, “[a] statement concerning the law is a misrepresentation of fact if 
it involves ‘statements that imply the existence of accurate and readily ascer-
tainable facts that either concern the law or have legal significance, but which 
are not part of the law themselves.’ ”91 Or, as a Minnesota court more succinctly 
stated, while “abstract statements of law or pure legal opinions are not actiona-
ble [as fraud], statements of law that imply knowledge of facts are actiona-
ble.”92 
 Second, a lawyer who offers a knowingly false legal opinion may commit 
fraud.93 Such cases are understandably rare because lawyers seldom have rea-
son to furnish knowingly false legal opinions, although it is conceivable that a 
lawyer who is desperate to tell a client what it wants to hear to attract or retain 
business, or who is hoping to conceal some error or misconduct, might resort to 
such dishonesty.94 
 Third, there is a “relationship exception” to the general rule, which applies 
where: (a) the parties are in a fiduciary relationship; (b) the maker of the alleg-
edly false statement is a lawyer and the circumstances required her to divulge 
all the information she had to the plaintiff; or (c) the maker of the allegedly 
false statement is a lawyer and knows that the plaintiff was relying on her “as 
one learned in the law.”95 As the Alabama Supreme Court explained in discuss-
ing the relationship exception, “a client who asks the opinion of his attorney on 
                                                        
89  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining 
when statements of law constitute statements of opinion and when they constitute statements 
of fact). 
90  Zimmerman v. Kent, 575 N.E.2d 70, 75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting three Massachu-
setts cases). 
91  Brodeur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 153 (Colo. 2007) (quoting Equal 
Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Am., 412 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795–96 (S.D. Ohio 
2005)). 
92  Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 372–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006), aff’d, 736 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007). 
93  See, e.g., Green v. White, 494 S.E.2d 681, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a lawyer 
who allegedly knew that he gave his client inaccurate advice and did not inform the client); 
Brownell v. Garber, 503 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (determining that the plaintiff 
stated a cause of action for fraud by alleging that his divorce lawyer knew that a property 
settlement would have adverse tax consequences at the time he recommended it while repre-
senting otherwise, or never analyzed the tax aspects of the property settlement notwithstand-
ing his representations to the contrary); Rice v. Heilbronner, 708 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App. 
Div. 2000) (concluding that the “[p]laintiffs’ allegations that [the lawyer] expressed an opin-
ion that he did not believe to be true and made such statement with an intent to deceive 
[were] sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud”). 
94  See, e.g., Encinias v. Whitener Law Firm, P.A., 310 P.3d 611, 620 (N.M. 2013) (recogniz-
ing fraud claim against lawyer who allegedly told client that statute of limitations had not 
run when it had). 
95  Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154. 
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a point of law may assume that the attorney has special knowledge of the law 
and is entitled to a[n] honest opinion from him on which the client may justifi-
ably rely.”96 
 Finally, there is a “superior knowledge” or “special knowledge” exception 
to the general rule.97 It applies where a party to a transaction with superior 
knowledge about the subject of the transaction or an aspect of it opines on an 
issue material to the transaction.98 A lawyer’s allegedly false statements to an 
unrepresented non-lawyer are the paradigmatic case for application of this ex-
ception.99 
B. Fraudulent Concealment 
 In some instances, a dishonest defendant’s potential liability pivots not on a 
false statement of material fact, but on the alleged failure to disclose a key fact. 
Here, the cause of action is fraudulent concealment.100 Fraudulent concealment 
is simply another form of common law fraud.101 It is sometimes referred to as 
“fraud by silence,”102 or “silent fraud.”103 To establish fraudulent concealment, 
a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to dis-
close a material fact; (2) the defendant failed to do so; (3) the defendant intend-
ed to defraud or deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reli-
                                                        
96  Lawson v. Cagle, 504 So. 2d 226, 227 (Ala. 1987); see also Encinias, 310 P.3d at 620 
(“[I]t is reasonable for clients to assume that they can rely on their attorneys’ legal advice.”). 
97  Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154; GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh, 251 S.W.3d 854, 889–90 (Tex. App. 2008). 
98  Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154; Merrilees v. Merrilees, 998 N.E.2d 147, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2013). See, e.g., Boyles Bros. Drilling Co. v. Orion Indus., Ltd., 761 P.2d 278, 282 (Colo. 
App. 1988) (“The alleged misrepresentation here was as to the legal effect of words used in 
the indorsement [sic] and assignment. It was made by an attorney to a layman and goes to 
the very essence of the agreement between the parties.”). 
99  See, e.g., Boyles Bros., 761 P.2d at 282 (involving a lawyer’s statements to a layman; 
whether the layman was represented by counsel and thus could not claim reasonable reliance 
was a question of fact). 
100  See PNC Multifamily Capital Inst. Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. 
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party commits fraudulent conceal-
ment for failing to disclose a known fact or condition where he or she had a duty to disclose 
and another party reasonably relies upon the resulting misrepresentation, thereby suffering 
injury.”). 
101  See Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 332 
(Ct. App. 2008) (“Concealment is a species of fraud or deceit.”); Graphic Comm. Loc. 1B 
Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Minn. 2014) 
(“Under the common law, a party may be liable for fraud either by making an affirmative 
statement that is false or by concealing or not disclosing facts under certain circumstances.”); 
Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 246 n.11 (Tex. App. 2015) (describing fraudulent con-
cealment as a subcategory of common law fraud). 
102  See, e.g., Stechschulte v. Jennings, 298 P.3d 1083, 1097 (Kan. 2013) (listing the elements 
of the tort). 
103  See, e.g., Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100, 115–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (describing 
the tort this way). 
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ance on the concealment; and (5) the plaintiff was damaged as a result.104 As 
with common law fraud, fraudulent concealment allegations are subject to 
heightened pleading requirements, and a plaintiff generally must establish 
fraudulent concealment through clear and convincing evidence.105 
 The existence of a duty to disclose on the defendant’s part is the threshold 
inquiry in a fraudulent concealment case.106 A duty to disclose may be either 
legal or equitable,107 and may arise “where the parties have a relation of trust 
and confidence or where there is inequality of condition and knowledge, or 
where there are other attendant circumstances.”108  
 Obviously, the defendant must know of the subject fact to have a duty to 
disclose it.109 More particularly, the defendant must have actual knowledge of 
the fact; it is not enough that the defendant should have known of the fact or 
might have discovered it, or that knowledge of the fact might be imputed to the 
defendant.110 
 Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis, & Pogue111 is an interesting fraudulent con-
cealment case against a law firm. Vega arose out of Transmedia Asia Pacific, 
Inc.’s merger with Monsterbook.com. Jones Day represented Transmedia, 
while Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe represented Monsterbook.112 Plain-
tiff Frank Vega owned common stock in Monsterbook.com and his shares were 
exchanged in the merger for shares of Transmedia restricted stock.113  
 In March 2000, Transmedia agreed to acquire Monsterbook in a stock deal 
that valued Monsterbook at $15 million.114 Shortly after execution of the mer-
ger agreement, but before closing, Transmedia agreed to issue $10 million in 
“toxic” convertible preferred stock to a third party.115 Although the toxicity of 
the preferred stock is not explained in the opinion, it had the effect of diluting 
the value of the shares of Transmedia stock held by all other Transmedia share-
holders, including Vega.116 
 Following Transmedia’s commitment to issue the convertible preferred 
stock, Jones Day prepared and sent to Heller Ehrman, for execution by the 
                                                        
104  Blondell v. Littlepage, 991 A.2d 80, 94 (Md. 2010) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
916 A.2d 257, 274 (Md. 2007)). 
105  Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 82 A.3d 101, 102 (Me. 2013). 
106  Blondell, 991 A.2d at 93. 
107  Barr v. Dyke, 49 A.3d 1280, 1287 (Me. 2012); Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 152 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013). 
108  Hobson v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 432 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). 
109  PNC Multifamily Capital Inst. Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
387 S.W.3d 525, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 
110  Jehly v. Brown, 327 P.3d 351, 353–55 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). 
111  17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Ct. App. 2004). 
112  Id. at 29. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
16 NEV. L.J. 57, RICHMOND - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  1:34 PM 
72 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:57  
Monsterbook shareholders, a form seeking written consent to Transmedia’s is-
suance of the preferred stock.117 The form reflected the initial conversion rate 
of the preferred stock, but it did not reflect the toxic anti-dilution provisions, 
instead referring to a certificate to be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State 
that would reflect the deal’s complete terms.118 Meanwhile, in connection with 
the Delaware Secretary of State filing, Jones Day prepared a disclosure sched-
ule that “clearly described and properly disclosed” the toxic aspect of the third-
party investment, but did not share that schedule with Heller Ehrman, allegedly 
because doing so would have killed the merger.119 In sum, Jones Day prepared 
two versions of a disclosure schedule relating to the convertible preferred stock 
for inclusion with the merger agreement, but sent only the unrevealing one to 
Heller Ehrman.120 
 Later that month, Transmedia filed the certificate with respect to the con-
vertible preferred stock with the Secretary of State of Delaware and closed the 
preferred stock financing.121 Heller Ehrman apparently never requested a copy 
of the certificate from Jones Day or from the Delaware Secretary of State.122 In 
April 2000, Transmedia completed its acquisition of Monsterbook and Mon-
sterbook’s former common stockholders thus became common stockholders of 
Transmedia.123 Vega, however, did not learn of the full terms of the convertible 
preferred stock transaction until December 2000.124  
 Vega sued Jones Day in California state court for negligent misrepresenta-
tion and fraud.125 With respect to the fraud claim, the key issue was Jones 
Day’s allegedly active concealment or suppression of material facts.126 The trial 
court dismissed Vega’s case on Jones Day’s demurrer and Vega appealed.127 
 As the appellate court summarized Vega’s fraudulent concealment theory, 
“Jones Day hid the existence of the ‘toxic’ stock provisions with the intent to 
induce Vega to give up his valuable stock in Monsterbook in exchange for 
Transmedia’s . . . worthless stock.”128 Jones Day deliberately concealed the tox-
ic stock provisions by failing to provide proper written disclosure, and by in-
                                                        
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 30, 35. 
119  Id. at 29. 
120  Id. at 29–30. 
121  Id. at 30. 
122  Id. at 29–30, 33. 
123  Id. at 30. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 29. 
126  See id. at 32 (discussing the elements of fraud and the active concealment or suppression 
of material facts as the equivalent of a false statement). 
127  Id. at 31; Demurrer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that a de-
murrer is the equivalent of a motion to dismiss a case for failing to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted). 
128  Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31. 
16 NEV. L.J. 57, RICHMOND - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  1:34 PM 
Fall 2015] FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION 73 
stead providing a sanitized version of the disclosure.129 Vega purportedly lost 
his $3.45 million interest in Monsterbook as a result.130 
 After observing that “[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no different from a 
fraud claim against anyone else,”131 and rejecting fraud liability against Jones 
Day based on an allegedly false statement about the unremarkable nature of the 
third-party transaction,132 the court turned to Jones Day’s fraud based on non-
disclosure: 
More problematic, however, is the question of active concealment or suppres-
sion of facts, which is the equivalent of a false representation. Vega alleges that 
Jones Day, after telling Heller Ehrman that Transmedia was about to close a 
$ 10 million private stock transaction which it wanted to include in its disclosure 
schedules, prepared a proper disclosure schedule containing the pertinent terms, 
but provided a “different sanitized version” of the schedule, without the “toxic” 
stock provisions. Thus, Vega alleges that Jones Day “deliberately or with a reck-
less disregard of the truth concealed the ‘toxic’ stock provisions” from Vega, 
Monsterbook and Heller Ehrman. These allegations state an “active concealment 
or suppression of facts.”133  
 Jones Day argued that liability for fraudulent concealment requires the de-
fendant to have a duty to disclose the suppressed fact, and that as Transmedia’s 
counsel, it had no duty to disclose the terms of the third-party investment to 
Monsterbook, its shareholders, or Heller Ehrman.134 Thus, its failure to share 
the complete disclosure schedule was “entirely irrelevant.”135 The Vega court 
disagreed, reasoning that Jones Day specifically undertook to disclose the third-
party transaction and, having done so, could not conceal a material term.136 
Even if no duty to disclose otherwise exists, “where one does speak he must 
speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which mate-
rially qualify those stated.”137 Although Jones Day owed no professional duty 
of care to Vega as an adverse party in a merger, it did have a duty “not to de-
fraud another, even if that other [was] [Heller Ehrman] negotiating at arm’s 
length.”138 Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Vega’s 
complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings.139 
 Business lawyers might well argue that the Vega court erred in ruling as it 
did. The disclosure schedules were Transmedia’s, not Jones Day’s. There could 
                                                        
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 29. 
131  Id. at 31. 
132  Id. at 32. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 33. 
135  Id. (quoting Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue’s brief). 
136  Id. 
137  Id. (quoting Cicone v. URS Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
138  Id. at 34 (quoting Shafer v. Berger, Khan, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 790 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
139  Id. at 39. 
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have been no active concealment of the preferred stock transaction when the 
transaction’s terms were available from the Delaware Secretary of State and a 
Jones Day lawyer had apparently told a Heller Ehrman lawyer that Transmedia 
was “about to close a private stock financing” that was not listed in the Trans-
media’s disclosure schedules before the preferred stock deal closed.140 If Heller 
Ehrman: (a) failed to follow up on the telephone alert to the third-party financ-
ing; (b) failed to obtain the certificate from the Delaware Secretary of State; or 
(c) did not request a copy of the certificate and any related documents from 
Transmedia before permitting the Transmedia-Monsterbook transaction to 
close, then it was Heller Ehrman that should have been in Vega’s crosshairs—
not Jones Day. 
But even if all those arguments resonate with practicing lawyers, it is un-
derstandable that the Vega court would hold as it did. To start, the case came to 
it on an appeal from a demurrer. The court thus assumed all well-pleaded facts 
in Vega’s complaint to be true and applied a de novo standard of review to de-
termine whether the complaint stated a cause of action on any theory.141 In 
short, the standard of review strongly favored Vega. Although it is true that the 
disclosure schedules were Transmedia’s and not Jones Day’s,142 the record re-
flected that Jones Day prepared them and, having prepared two versions, shared 
only the supposedly innocent one with Heller Ehrman143—arguably because 
sharing the schedule that included the preferred stock transaction would have 
aborted the Transmedia-Monsterbook deal. The fact that Jones Day did so as 
Transmedia’s agent did not absolve Jones Day of its own potential liability for 
fraud.144 As for Jones Day’s argument that there could have been no fraudulent 
concealment given the availability of the certificate and thus knowledge of the 
preferred stock transaction through the Delaware Secretary of State, the court 
disagreed, explaining that “[t]he mere fact that information exists somewhere in 
the public domain is by no means conclusive” when debating fraudulent con-
cealment.145 Finally, but critically, whether Jones Day concealed the contours 
or terms of the preferred stock transaction to induce Vega to believe that the 
transaction was immaterial, and whether the consent form stating that a certifi-
cate revealing the third-party investment and its terms would be filed in Dela-
ware, effectively furnished Vega with the information to which he was entitled 
were “questions of fact to be resolved on the evidence, not as a matter of law 
on a demurrer.”146 
                                                        
140  Id. at 29 n.2. 
141  Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(quoting Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 2012)). 
142  Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 29. 
143  Id. at 30. 
144  Shafer v. Berger, Khan, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
777, 788–90 (Ct. App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. LAW INST. 
2006). 
145  Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 35. 
146  Id. at 35–36. 
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C. Constructive Fraud 
 Unlike common law or actual fraud and fraud by concealment, which are 
similar wrongs, constructive fraud is distinguished by the parties’ relationship. 
Constructive fraud requires a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the 
parties.147 A “confidential relationship” for constructive fraud purposes is a re-
lationship in which one party reposes special trust and confidence in the other, 
with the latter positioned to have and exercise influence over the first.148 An at-
torney-client relationship unquestionably satisfies the fiduciary or confidential 
relationship requirement.149 On the other side of the coin, the absence of a con-
fidential or fiduciary relationship is fatal to a constructive fraud claim,150 mean-
ing that lawyers generally cannot be liable to third parties on this theory.151 
Given lawyers’ duty of loyalty to their clients, courts are understandably un-
willing to extend lawyers’ fiduciary duties to third parties.152 
 Constructive fraud does not require actual dishonesty or intent to deceive 
by the alleged offender.153 Even innocent misrepresentations, negligent misrep-
resentations, or failures to disclose material facts will support constructive 
fraud allegations.154 With constructive fraud, intent is inferred from the exist-
ence of the fiduciary or confidential relationship and its breach.155 In other 
words, the element of scienter that characterizes fraud and fraudulent conceal-
ment is replaced in constructive fraud theory by a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship.156 The law describes the breach of a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship as fraud because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidences, or to 
injure public interests.157 Apart from the replacement of the element of scienter 
with a confidential or fiduciary relationship, the other requirements for com-
mon law fraud liability remain in place.158 
                                                        
147  Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Ct. App. 
2014) (quoting Michel v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
148  Estate of Draper v. Bank of Am., N.A., 205 P.3d 698, 707 (Kan. 2009). 
149  Sanders v. Townsend, 582 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Ind. 1991). 
150  See, e.g., Petrello v. White, 412 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying New 
York law). 
151  See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 601–04 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that law-
yers were not liable for constructive fraud to investors with whom they had no attorney-
client relationship). 
152  Accident & Injury Med. Specialists, P.C. v. Mintz, 279 P.3d 658, 663 (Colo. 2012). 
153  Hobson v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 432 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014); Hemphill v. 
Shore, 289 P.3d 1173, 1182 (Kan. 2012); Eggleston v. Kovacich, 742 N.W.2d 471, 482 
(Neb. 2007); Croslin v. Enerlex, Inc., 308 P.3d 1041, 1045–46 (Okla. 2013). 
154  Croslin, 308 P.3d at 1046. 
155  Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (Idaho 2006). 
156  Petrello v. White, 412 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying New York law). 
157  Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, 893 A.2d 1067, 1095 (Md. 2006) (quoting Md. 
Envtl. Trust v. Gaynor, 803 A.2d 512, 516–17 (Md. 2002)); Eggleston, 742 N.W.2d at 482. 
158  Petrello, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 229 (discussing New York law). 
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 Constructive fraud also differs from common law or actual fraud in the al-
location of the burden of proof. In a constructive fraud case, once the plaintiff 
establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship with the defendant, thus 
making the challenged transaction presumptively fraudulent, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to prove that he acted fairly and honestly in the affair.159 Or, 
perhaps more precisely, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat any one of 
the remaining elements of the plaintiff’s constructive fraud claim and, in so do-
ing, disprove the claim altogether.160 The defendant generally must do so by 
clear and convincing evidence.161 
 If a plaintiff pleads both breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud 
claims, there is a reasonable likelihood that a court will determine the causes of 
action to be duplicative and dismiss one as superfluous, or submit only one of 
them to the jury.162 That is not always the case, however, and it certainly is not 
assured in jurisdictions where constructive fraud is distinguished from breach 
of fiduciary duty by an additional requirement: that a defendant charged with 
constructive fraud sought to gain some advantage or benefit through her posi-
tion of trust.163 Fortunately for lawyers, the receipt of fees should not be treated 
as a benefit that will support liability for constructive fraud.164 This is because a 
lawyer’s fee generally can be divorced from conduct allegedly constituting 
constructive fraud.165 In other words, a lawyer gains no advantage or benefit 
through a fee paid to her in connection with a matter tainted by constructive 
fraud because the lawyer would have earned a fee if she had acted properly in 
the representation.166 By way of qualification, this reasoning seems to depend 
                                                        
159  Culhane v. Culhane, 969 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 (D. Conn. 2013) (applying Connecticut 
law); King v. Bryant, 737 S.E.2d 802, 809 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Collier v. Bryant, 
719 S.E.2d 70, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)); Lee v. Hasson, 286 S.W.3d. 1, 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2007); Grubb v. Grubb, 630 S.E.2d 746, 751 (Va. 2006). 
160  Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
161  Utzler v. Braca, 972 A.2d 743, 755 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting Dunham v. Dunham, 
528 A.2d 1123, 1134 (Conn. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Santopietro v. 
New Haven, 682 A.2d 106, 109 n.8 (Conn. 1996)); Hassan v. Yusuf, 944 N.E.2d 895, 914 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Demming, 943 N.E.2d at 892; In re Jane Tiffany Living Trust 2001, 177 
P.3d 1060, 1063 (Nev. 2008); Grubb, 630 S.E.2d at 751. 
162  See In re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296, 327 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“On the facts of this 
case, the breach of fiduciary duty count confronts directly the implications of the fiduciary 
relationship, rendering the constructive fraud count redundant and superfluous.”). 
163  See, e.g., Sheaff Brock Inv. Advisors, LLC v. Morton, 7 N.E.3d 278, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2014) (listing as an element of constructive fraud “the gaining of an advantage by the party 
to be charged at the expense of the complaining party”); Dewey v. Stringer, 325 P.3d 1236, 
1239–40 (Mont. 2014) (quoting Montana’s constructive fraud statute); Crumley & Assocs., 
P.C. v. Charles Peed & Assocs., P.A., 730 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“To estab-
lish constructive fraud, a plaintiff must show that defendant (1) owes plaintiff a fiduciary 
duty; (2) breached this fiduciary duty; and (3) sought to benefit himself in the transaction.”). 
164  NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Parker, 535 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (N.C. 1997)). 
165  See id. 
166  Id. 
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on the lawyer’s fee not being inflated by the conduct allegedly constituting 
constructive fraud.167 
D. Negligent Misrepresentation 
 In addition to potential liability for some form of fraud, lawyers may be ac-
cused of negligent misrepresentation.168 Most jurisdictions have adopted the 
definition of negligent misrepresentation set forth in section 552(1) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts: 
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any 
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information 
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, 
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communi-
cating the information.169  
Liability for negligent misrepresentation is principally distinguished from 
liability for fraud by the defendant’s mental state.170 Negligent misrepresenta-
tion requires no intent to deceive by the defendant.171 The defendant need not 
know that the statement in dispute is false;172 rather, a defendant need only be 
careless or negligent in ascertaining the truth of the statement.173 Thus, a de-
fendant may be liable for negligent misrepresentation where she acted with no 
ill intent but failed to exercise the degree or level of care required under the cir-
cumstances.174 
 Negligent misrepresentation, like other forms of negligence, naturally 
counts among its elements a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.175 This 
                                                        
167  See id. (“Allegations . . . are that defendant ‘took advantage of his position of trust and 
benefit[t]ed . . . in that he was paid for his services in closing the subject loan transaction.’ 
There was no evidence that the amount paid defendant for notarizing and witnessing the loan 
documents would have been any different if the documents had not been forged.”) (emphasis 
added). 
168  See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564–68 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming a 
judgment against a lawyer); Wafra Leasing Corp. v. Prime Capital Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 
852, 873–74 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (concluding that the plaintiff had stated a negligent misrepre-
sentation claim against a lawyer based on statements in an opinion letter). 
169  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
170  Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 973 N.E.2d 880, 889 (Ill. 
2012); Zawaideh v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Regulation & Licensure, 825 
N.W.2d 204, 212 (Neb. 2013). 
171  Moncada v. W. Coast Quartz Corp., 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 611 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 
Intrieri v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 108 (Ct. App. 2004)); Sundberg v. TTR Realty, 
LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
172  Sundberg, 109 A.3d at 1131; Simmons v. Campion, 991 N.E.2d 924, 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2013). 
173  Jane Doe-3, 973 N.E.2d at 889. 
174  Nelson v. Wardyn, 820 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012). 
175  Sw. Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Nowak, 322 P.3d 204, 208 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Bock v. 
Hansen, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 302 (Ct. App. 2014); Simmons, Morris & Carroll, LLC v. 
Capital One, N.A., 144 So. 3d 1207, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Williams v. Smith, 820 
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duty is not boundless.176 It is not a duty to take every possible precaution 
against misstatements, nor is it a duty to be right about the content or subject of 
the representation; rather, it is the familiar duty to exercise reasonable care in 
the circumstances.177 
 Liability for negligent misrepresentation is more limited than liability for 
fraud.178 Section 552(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifies those 
limits in general terms, stating that a defendant’s liability for negligent misrep-
resentation is restricted to losses suffered: 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and 
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends 
to supply it; and  
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to in-
fluence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar trans-
action.179 
With respect to negligent misrepresentation claims against lawyers, plain-
tiffs usually are third parties.180 Clients seldom sue their lawyers for negligent 
misrepresentation for the simple reason that they do not need the cause of ac-
tion to vindicate their rights; ordinary professional negligence claims against 
lawyers may be based on either conduct or alleged misrepresentations.181 But 
while it is clear that third parties may sue lawyers for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, courts carefully define the classes of third parties to whom lawyers may 
owe duties and, in so doing, limit the reach or scope of lawyers’ duties.182 This 
attempt at precision is grounded in the recognition that whether a lawyer may 
be held to owe a duty to a third party “depends on balancing the attorney’s duty 
to represent clients vigorously . . . with the duty not to provide misleading in-
formation on which third parties foreseeably will rely.”183 As a result, a lawyer 
may owe a duty to a third party for negligent misrepresentation purposes when: 
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a third party will rely on 
                                                                                                                                 
N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. 2012); UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 94 A.3d 176, 191 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 273 (Md. 2007)). 
176  See Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Nev. 2013) (ex-
plaining limits on liability for negligent misrepresentation). 
177  Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cty., 714 S.E.2d 869, 873–74 (S.C. 2011) (quoting 
AMA Mgmt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992)). 
178  Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 344 (Tenn. 2012). 
179  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
180  See 1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 8, § 7:34. See, e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Berger, 
794 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 2005) (exonerating the lawyer because the plaintiff did 
not rely on the alleged negligent misrepresentation in an opinion letter). 
181  1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 8, § 7:34. 
182  See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 
N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) (limiting lawyers’ potential liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation to cases where “there [is] either actual privity of contract . . . or a relationship so close 
as to approach that of privity . . . in order to provide fair and manageable bounds to what 
otherwise could prove to be limitless liability”). 
183  Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357 (N.J. 1995). 
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her representation and the third party is not too remote from the lawyer to de-
serve protection;184 (2) the lawyer or her client (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) 
“invites” a third party to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or delivery of other legal 
services and the third party is not “too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to 
protection;185 or (3) the lawyer and the third party enjoy a relationship of “near-
privity.”186 In fact, all of these descriptions of lawyers’ duties to third parties 
comport with the section 552(2) restrictions.187 
 Although fraud and negligent misrepresentation are different causes of ac-
tion, and fraud is plainly distinguished from negligent misrepresentation by the 
element of scienter, misrepresentation is a core concept of each claim. This 
raises the parallel questions of (1) whether plaintiffs suing for negligent misrep-
resentation should have to meet the stringent pleading requirement for fraud; 
and (2) whether plaintiffs should have to prove negligent misrepresentation by 
clear and convincing evidence, the common standard for fraud cases. 
 The easy answer to both questions is no. As to the first, rules of civil pro-
cedure that mandate particularized pleading for fraud do not similarly specify 
negligent misrepresentation;188 negligence claims do not have to be pleaded 
with particularity;189 and, from a defendant’s perspective, negligent misrepre-
sentation allegations do not pose the potential reputational harm that fraud alle-
gations do.190 Regarding the second question, proof of negligence is evaluated 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard and negligent misrepresenta-
tion is simply a form of that tort.191 Not all courts accept these answers, howev-
er. 
Federal courts are split on whether plaintiffs must plead negligent misrep-
resentation with the particularity required for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b), or whether negligent misrepresentation allegations are gov-
                                                        
184  Id. at 1359–60. 
185  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
186  Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 612 F. Supp. 
2d 267, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying New York law); see also Hedges v. Durrance, 834 
A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2003) (reciting an identical standard). 
187  See Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1359–60 (referring to a draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS and to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552); McCamish, 
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 793–95 (Tex. 1999) 
(reasoning to the same effect). 
188  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with par-
ticularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”). 
189  Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP., 475 F.3d 824, 837 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
190  Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003). 
191  Commercial Molasses Corp. v. N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 113 (1941) (negli-
gence must be proven by a preponderance standard); Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1154 (Nev. 2013) (evidence needed to prove negligent misrepresenta-
tion is “almost identical” to that needed to prove negligence). 
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erned by the less rigorous notice pleading requirement of Rule 8,192 as under-
stood in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly193 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.194 The First and Second Circuits hold that 
negligent misrepresentation claims are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened plead-
ing standard.195 The First Circuit requires a plaintiff to plead negligent misrep-
resentation with particularity under Rule 9(b) because the cause of action at its 
core “effectively charge[s] fraud.”196 In comparison, the Second Circuit 
grounds its approach in the recognition that plaintiffs suing for negligent mis-
representation often plead fraud in the alternative, and vice versa, and it makes 
little practical sense to impose inconsistent standards of proof.197 While the Se-
cond Circuit’s approach has practical appeal, the First Circuit’s approach 
makes no sense at all. A negligent misrepresentation claim does not effectively 
charge fraud for the simple reason that liability for negligent misrepresentation 
does not require a defendant to have acted with scienter.198 
In contrast to the First and Second Circuits, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
adhere to the more forgiving Rule 8 notice pleading requirement for negligent 
misrepresentation.199 The Fifth Circuit relies on a literal reading of Rule 9(b),200 
which refers only to fraud or mistake, and the Seventh Circuit appears to do 
likewise.201 The Fifth Circuit may, however, require parties to plead negligent 
misrepresentation with particularity when they do not “urge[ ] a separate focus 
on the negligent misrepresentation claims,” as where fraud and negligent mis-
representation causes of action “are based on the same set of alleged facts.”202  
                                                        
192  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 
193  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
194  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss 
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclu-
sions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the 
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are 
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). 
195  N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 
2009); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 583 n.14 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
196  Cardinale, 567 F.3d at 15. 
197  Aniero, 404 F.3d at 583 n.14. 
198  See Renaissance Leasing, LLC. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 134 (Mo. 2010) 
(“A claim for negligent misrepresentation, unlike one for fraud, does not involve a question 
of intent. Rather, such a claim is premised on the theory that the speaker believed the infor-
mation supplied was correct but was negligent in so believing.”). 
199  Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP., 475 F.3d 824, 839 n.10 (7th 
Cir. 2007); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2005). 
200  Posey, 415 F.3d at 396–97. 
201  Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 839 n.10. 
202  Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that the correct pleading 
standard depends on applicable state law.203 In short, if “negligent misrepresen-
tation is a subspecies of fraud” under applicable state law or the state law re-
quires an essential showing of fraud as an element of negligent misrepresenta-
tion,204 these courts will apply the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard.205 At 
least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has taken the same approach.206 By 
extension, lawyers must also recognize that the pleading standard for negligent 
misrepresentation versus fraud varies between states.207 
With respect to the burden of proof, courts are again split. Some courts 
hold that a plaintiff must prove negligent misrepresentation by a preponderance 
of the evidence,208 while other courts require clear and convincing evidence,209 
which is the standard generally applied to fraud claims. The former approach 
makes more sense because, again, negligent misrepresentation is a form of neg-
ligence and generally does not carry the risk of stigma or reputational harm that 
accompanies liability for fraud. On the other hand, most lawyers value their 
professional reputations and count on their good standing to advance their prac-
                                                        
203  Farm Credit Servs. of Am., FLCA v. Haun, 734 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2013); Republic 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247–48 (6th Cir. 2012); Baltimore 
Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 921 (4th Cir. 2007); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 
USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). 
204  See Farm Credit Servs. of Am., 734 F.3d at 805 (applying Nebraska law, which treats 
negligent misrepresentation as a “subspecies of fraud”); Baltimore Cnty., 238 F. App’x at 
921 (holding that Rule 9(b) did not apply because Maryland law did not require an essential 
showing of fraud to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation). 
205  See, e.g., Republic Bank & Trust Co., 683 F.3d at 247–48 (applying Kentucky law). 
206  City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143–44 (D.N.M. 2008) 
(discussing Colorado and New Mexico law). 
207  Compare Thomas v. Schneider, No. 2009-CA-002132-MR, 2010 WL 3447662, at *1 n.2 
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (“Like fraud, allegations of negligent misrepresentation must be 
pled with particularity.”), and Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of 
City of Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that because “negligent 
misrepresentation constitutes fraud,” a plaintiff must plead negligent misrepresentation with 
particularity), with Hayes v. Iworx, Inc., No. CV-06-168, 2006 WL 2959702, at *4 (Me. Su-
per. Ct. July 31, 2006) (“A claim for negligent misrepresentation . . . does not sound in fraud 
or mistake, but in negligence, and [Rule] 9(b)’s pleading requirements are inapplicable to 
claims sounding in negligence.”), and Davis, Malm, D’Agostine, P.C. v. Vale, No. 041495, 
2005 WL 1155171, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005) (“A claim of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation must be pleaded with particularity. . . . Negligent misrepresentation, on the other 
hand, need only be averred generally.”), and Delaney v. Bates, No. BDV-92-1120, 1993 
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 698, at *9 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 1993) (“Unlike pleading fraud, there 
is no requirement that negligent misrepresentation be plead with any degree of particulari-
ty.”), and Hunter v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 593 S.E.2d 595, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (declining to impose a particularity requirement on plaintiff’s negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim as it did on fraud claim). 
208  See, e.g., Holland v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co., 3 So. 3d 94, 101 (Miss. 2008); In re Con-
visser, 242 P.3d 299, 307 (N.M. 2010); McLaughlin v. Williams, 665 S.E.2d 667, 670 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2008); Excel Constr., Inc. v. HKM Eng’g, Inc., 228 P.3d 40, 49 (Wyo. 2010). 
209  See, e.g., Aesthetics in Jewelry, Inc. v. Brown, 339 S.W.3d 489, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2011); Dewar v. Smith, 342 P.3d 328, 336 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
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tices in a variety of ways, and therefore consider any finding of liability to be 
injurious. It is thus fair for lawyers to argue that, in their cases, plaintiffs should 
be required to prove negligent misrepresentation by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The strong counter-argument, of course, is that negligent misrepresenta-
tion calls into question a lawyer’s carefulness in a single matter rather than her 
honesty, and it is only the latter that can reasonably be considered to have repu-
tational value supporting a higher burden of proof. Were it otherwise, profes-
sional negligence claims against lawyers would always call for proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
E. The Role of Rules of Professional Conduct  
In considering the issue of duty in negligent misrepresentation cases and 
justifiable or reasonable reliance in both fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims, it is logical to question the role that rules of professional conduct do or 
should play in making these determinations. Several ethics rules appear to have 
obvious application depending on the facts of the case. For example, Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) provides that a lawyer “shall not counsel a 
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal 
or fraudulent.”210 Model Rule 4.1(a) states that in representing a client, a lawyer 
“shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person.”211 Model Rule 4.1(b) provides that in representing a client, a 
lawyer cannot “knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a third person 
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client,” unless the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 pro-
hibits disclosure.212 Finally, Model Rule 8.4(c) broadly prohibits lawyers from 
engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion.”213 
To be sure, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule is not independently ac-
tionable.214 Thus, and by way of example, a person to whom a lawyer allegedly 
made a false statement of material fact could not sue the lawyer for negligent 
misrepresentation on the basis that the lawyer violated Rule 8.4(c), which, to 
repeat, prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct involving “misrepresenta-
                                                        
210  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
211  Id. r. 4.1(a). 
212  Id. r. 4.1(b). 
213  Id. r. 8.4(c). 
214  Accident & Injury Med. Specialists, P.C. v. Mintz, 279 P.3d 658, 664 (Colo. 2012); In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Montez, 812 N.W.2d 58, 66–67 (Minn. 2012); Lucas v. Steven-
son, 294 P.3d 377, 382 (Mont. 2013); Green v. Morgan Props., 73 A.3d 478, 494 (N.J. 
2013); Spencer v. Barber, 299 P.3d 388, 395–96 (N.M. 2013); Unarco Material Handling, 
Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Joyner v. DeFriend, 255 
S.W.3d 281, 283 (Tex. App. 2008); Behnke v. Ahrens, 294 P.3d 729, 738 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2012); Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 929, 937 (2007). 
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tion.”215 But what of the more confined question of duty? Model Rules 4.1(a) 
and 8.4(c) certainly impose a duty of honesty on lawyers in a professional re-
sponsibility sense. Could a plaintiff claiming negligent misrepresentation suc-
cessfully extend that duty to tort law and allege that a lawyer owed her a duty 
of reasonable care under the circumstances by virtue of Model Rules 4.1(a) and 
8.4(c)?  
While there are sound arguments in some cases for basing a lawyer’s al-
leged duty on related rules of professional conduct, courts have held that the 
answer to that question is no; any alleged duty has to be grounded in the com-
mon law.216 In our hypothetical case, that would likely be case law in the juris-
diction adopting section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.217 Indeed, if 
the jurisdiction had adopted section 552, the plaintiff would not need Model 
Rules 4.1(a) or 8.4(c) or state analogs to support an alleged duty.218 
This does not mean, however, that rules of professional conduct are irrele-
vant to our hypothetical plaintiff or to the duty owed by the defending lawyer. 
Although the rules may not be employed to establish the lawyer’s duty, they 
may be relevant to the standard of care or conduct against which the lawyer’s 
duty is measured.219 For example, the plaintiff might rely on Rule 4.1(a) or 
Rule 8.4(c) to argue that the lawyer did not exercise reasonable care in obtain-
ing or communicating the information at issue—that the lawyer’s ethical obli-
gations required her to do more to ascertain that the information was accurate, 
or that because of the rules the lawyer was obligated to do more along those 
lines than someone else would have been. 
Rules of professional conduct play a greater role in negligent misrepresen-
tation and fraud cases in which the defending lawyer contends that the plaintiff 
did not justifiably or reasonably rely on her alleged misstatements. Here, ethics 
rules imposing on lawyers an obligation of honesty to third parties may be quite 
relevant to the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reliance on a lawyer’s representa-
tions.220 An essential fact, however, will be the plaintiff’s knowledge of those 
rules. For a plaintiff to have justifiably relied on a lawyer’s statements based on 
ethics rules imposing a duty of honesty on the lawyer, such as Model Rules 
                                                        
215  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
216  Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Indiana law); 
Blankinship v. Brown, 399 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Tex. App. 2013). 
217  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Information Neg-
ligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others”). 
218  See generally Schmitz v. Davis, No. 10-CV-4011-SAC, 2010 WL 3861843, at *7 (D. 
Kan. Sept. 23, 2010) (observing that “[a]ttorney conduct which violates an ethics rule may 
also violate an independent legal duty and a cause of action may ensue”). 
219  Rosenbaum, 692 F.3d at 604; Spencer, 299 P.3d at 395–96. 
220  Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 73 P.3d 687, 703 (Haw. 2003); see also 
Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“A jury could reasonably conclude that because attorneys have a professional duty not to 
make false assertions, even to adversaries, [the plaintiffs’ owner’s] reliance was reasona-
ble.”). 
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4.1(a) or 8.4(c), the plaintiff must have known of the rules and the duties they 
impose on lawyers at the time of the alleged misrepresentation.221 Furthermore, 
the application of ethics rules alone will seldom serve to establish plaintiffs’ 
justifiable or reasonable reliance; other factors frequently come into play.222 
Still, there is no doubting the potential force of rules of professional conduct 
when analyzing the element of reliance in fraud and negligent misrepresenta-
tion cases against lawyers.223  
Rules of professional conduct may play a greater role in constructive fraud 
cases because constructive fraud requires a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship between the parties.224 Ethics rules may inform the scope of lawyers’ fidu-
ciary duties.225 In some jurisdictions, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule may 
be sufficient to support a plaintiff’s claim that the lawyer violated a fiduciary 
duty.226 Thus, in a constructive fraud case, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule 
might evidence a breach of fiduciary duty, ultimately leading to liability for 
constructive fraud if the plaintiff can satisfy the remaining elements of the 
cause of action.  
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
Lawyers may be sued for fraud or negligent misrepresentation in various 
contexts. This Part discusses four illustrative cases: two based on lawyers’ 
statements in connection with litigation, and two arising out of lawyers’ trans-
actional practices. 
A. Settlement Negotiations in Litigation 
Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York227 arose out of a medical mal-
practice case. Charlotte Slotkin gave birth to a brain-damaged son, Steven, in 
Beth-El Hospital in New York City in 1963.228 She was a diabetic and Steven’s 
                                                        
221  See, e.g., Hoyt Props., 716 N.W.2d at 375 (involving a business owner who was a lawyer 
and who thus was aware of the opposing lawyers’ duties not to make false statements of fact 
or law under Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1). 
222  See Richmond, supra note 214, at 960 (discussing a plaintiff’s reliance on a lawyer’s al-
leged misrepresentation in a Missouri case). 
223  See, e.g., Hoyt Props., 716 N.W.2d at 375 (holding that the reasonableness of the plain-
tiff’s owner’s reliance on the accuracy of the statements made by opposing counsel based on 
their duties under Rule 4.1 presented a genuine issue of material fact that precluded sum-
mary judgment for the defense). 
224  Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Ct. App. 
2014). 
225  Id. at 851; Kidney Ass’n of Or., Inc. v. Ferguson, 843 P.2d 442, 446 n.12 (Or. 1992) (ex-
plaining that rules of professional conduct may describe lawyers’ fiduciary duties to clients 
at least in part). 
226  See, e.g., Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying District of Co-
lumbia law). 
227  614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979). 
228  Id. at 305. 
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brain damage was attributable to the hospital’s failure to properly administer 
insulin to her before delivery.229 Steven and his father sued Beth-El for medical 
malpractice. Beth-El had a $200,000 primary liability insurance policy with 
Citizens Casualty Co. and a $1 million excess insurance policy issued by 
Lloyd’s of London underwriters.230 Citizens was in somewhat precarious finan-
cial shape, inasmuch as it was undergoing liquidation and rehabilitation.231 
The case went to trial in February 1971. Christopher McGrath, a Beth-El 
defense lawyer hired by Citizens, told the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Max Toberoff, that 
Beth-El had only $200,000 in insurance coverage.232 McGrath also revealed 
that he had not told Beth-El’s in-house lawyer about the trial and he refused 
Toberoff’s request that he notify the hospital.233 Toberoff was concerned about 
the collectability of any judgment the plaintiffs might receive and he urgently 
communicated with the hospital’s administrator, telling him that Beth-El risked 
a verdict exceeding $1 million.234 The administrator dispatched George Berko-
witz, a lawyer and Beth-El trustee, to the courthouse.235 Berkowitz also told 
Toberoff that Beth-El had only $200,000 in insurance coverage based on in-
formation he obtained from McGrath, another defense lawyer, and Citizens’ 
claims manager, Paul Ratner.236 Both Toberoff and the trial judge thought it 
odd that Beth-El had so little insurance.237 
Despite Beth-El’s ostensibly low policy limits and the plaintiffs’ willing-
ness to settle within them, the case proceeded to trial. The trial unfolded nicely 
for the plaintiffs.238 Just before the plaintiffs rested, a key medical expert for 
Beth-El changed his opinion and sided with them.239 The parties hastily con-
vened a settlement conference before the trial judge.240 McGrath again stated 
that the total insurance coverage available was $200,000, and that “he knew 
that the [h]ospital did not have additional insurance with other companies.”241 
Based on this representation, the case settled for $185,000.242 The lawyers 
drafted a stipulation to read into the record which provided that “the attorney 
for the defendant represents that the total insurance coverage of the defendant is 
the sum of $200,000, under a policy with Citizens Casualty, and to the best of 
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232  Id. 
233  Id. 
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235  Id. 
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237  Id. at 306. 
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239  Id. at 307. 
240  Id. 
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his knowledge there are no other policies covering this event.”243 McGrath and 
Berkowitz verbally approved the stipulation on the record.244 
The obvious problem was that McGrath’s and Berkowitz’s representations 
were false.245 While Berkowitz’s misstatements could be excused due to his se-
cond-hand knowledge and the lack of a reason to doubt its sources, the same 
could not be said of McGrath’s misrepresentations. McGrath had “complete ac-
cess” to documents clearly demonstrating the existence of the excess policy, 
such as letters from a lawyer for the Lloyd’s of London underwriters inquiring 
about the Slotkin case.246 The file containing these letters was in the possession 
of McGrath’s firm during the trial.247 
The existence of the Lloyd’s of London excess policy was revealed shortly 
after the settlement.248 The trial judge had not yet entered an order allocating 
the settlement funds and thus there was no final judgment.249 Unfortunately, the 
parties could not re-open settlement discussions because the Lloyd’s underwrit-
ers refused to participate based on late notice of the Slotkin claim.250 For a vari-
ety of reasons, the plaintiffs could not re-try the case.251 The trial court thus ap-
proved the $185,000 settlement, with Toberoff’s intention to sue for fraud 
being well known.252 
The plaintiffs sued Citizens, its reinsurers, McGrath, Ratner, Berkowitz, 
and another lawyer for Citizens in federal court.253 The jury returned a 
$680,000 verdict for the plaintiffs for fraud, allocating the damages as 
$500,000 to Citizens, $100,000 to Berkowitz, $60,000 to Ratner, and $20,000 
to McGrath.254 The district court granted the defendants’ motion for JNOV.255 It 
reasoned that because the plaintiffs learned of the excess policy before the trial 
court had entered a final judgment, they were bound by the settlement.256 The 
court further reasoned that the “plaintiffs had not significantly changed position 
to their prejudice before learning the truth” about the hospital’s insurance cov-
erage.257 The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit. 
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On appeal, the Slotkin court concluded that the district court erred in grant-
ing the defendants’ motion for JNOV.258 Believing that the jury could have rea-
sonably found that the various misrepresentations made to the plaintiffs consti-
tuted legal fraud, the court addressed the defendants’ liability.259 
The Second Circuit reasoned that the jury could have properly found 
McGrath liable for fraud.260 McGrath stipulated that to the best of his 
knowledge, there was only $200,000 in insurance coverage available to Beth-
El, despite his possession of documents indicating that the hospital had $1 mil-
lion in excess coverage.261 McGrath’s insistence that the hospital had only 
$200,000 in coverage in the face of contrary facts met the New York definition 
of scienter: “ ‘a reckless indifference to error,’ ‘a pretense of exact knowledge,’ 
or ‘[an] assertion of a false material fact “susceptible of accurate knowledge” 
but stated to be true on the personal knowledge of the representer.’ ”262 Berko-
witz, on the other hand, avoided liability.263 While he was easily negligent or 
even grossly negligent in making the statements that he did about Beth-El’s in-
surance, his conduct did not reflect the scienter necessary for fraud liability un-
der New York law.264 The court ultimately gave the plaintiffs the option of ei-
ther reinstating the $680,000 judgment, or retrying the case against all 
defendants except Berkowitz.265 McGrath petitioned for rehearing to no avail.266 
It is difficult to understand how McGrath could have made the representa-
tions he did about insurance coverage. The notion that Beth-El had only 
$200,000 in coverage struck both Toberoff and the trial court as unusual; it 
should have similarly impressed McGrath. At the very least, Toberoff’s and the 
court’s reservations should have inspired McGrath to attempt to ascertain the 
hospital’s true coverage before finally committing to $200,000. 
It seems more likely that McGrath knew of the hospital’s excess policy and 
opted to conceal its existence. After all, he had correspondence from a lawyer 
for the excess carrier inquiring about the status of the case in his files.267 A de-
fense lawyer in McGrath’s shoes would normally be expected to know about 
the existence of excess insurance.268 It is no answer to say that McGrath had 
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266  Id. at 324–25. 
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268  Today, McGrath would certainly know about the existence of excess coverage by virtue 
of routine pretrial discovery and disclosures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring 
the initial disclosure of “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be 
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nothing to gain and much to lose from concealing the excess policy,269 because 
he arguably did have something to gain by concealing it. That is, by settling a 
difficult case on favorable terms, he might have impressed Citizens or the 
Lloyd’s underwriters with his craftiness and thus have earned additional busi-
ness from them. Or, he might have thought that Beth-El administrators would 
be impressed by his tactical prowess and engage him to defend the hospital in 
future medical malpractice cases. Regardless, Slotkin demonstrates that fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation claims against lawyers can even arise out of 
adversarial encounters. 
B. Litigators’ Allegedly Fraudulent Statements Outside of Settlement 
Negotiations  
Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon, & Gladstone,270 like 
Slotkin, arose out of a lawyer’s misstatement about insurance coverage, albeit 
in a different context. The plaintiffs in Shafer were homeowners who pursued 
arbitration against their builder, Tri County Builders, and Tri County’s two 
partners, Jay DeMay and Perry Hanstad, to recover for construction defects in 
their home.271 The Shafers’ arbitration demand included claims for breach of 
contract, fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
sought both compensatory and punitive damages.272 DeMay tendered the de-
fense of the Shafers’ action to Tri County’s liability insurer, Truck Insurance 
Exchange (“Truck”).273 Truck agreed to defend Tri County, DeMay, and Han-
stad under a reservation of rights.274 DeMay responded to Truck’s reservation 
of rights letter by asking Truck to provide him with independent counsel at its 
expense.275 DeMay was concerned that because the Shafers alleged both negli-
gent and intentional wrongdoing, any defense lawyer Truck appointed would 
                                                                                                                                 
for payments made to satisfy the judgment”). Toberoff would know about the presence of 
excess insurance for the same reason. 
269  Slotkin, 614 F.2d at 318–19 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). 
270  131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Ct. App. 2003). 
271  Id. at 782. 
272  Id. 
273  Id. 
274  Id. A “reservation of rights” refers to an insurance company’s unilateral decision to re-
serve its right to later contest coverage notwithstanding its initial decision to defend the in-
sured. See Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1139–40 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2008) (“By definition, a reservation of rights means that the insurer does not believe 
that coverage is available under the policy, but that it is proceeding to defend a claim in or-
der to control the defense.”). An insurer reserves its rights by sending the insured a reserva-
tion of rights letter. A reservation of rights letter puts the insured on notice that there may be 
a conflict between its interests and those of the insurer, and that the insured may potentially 
be exposed to personal liability. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Stephens, 825 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
275  Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783. For more information about insureds’ right to independ-
ent counsel, see Douglas R. Richmond, Independent Counsel in Insurance, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 857, 858–59 (2011). 
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have a conflict of interest given that a finding of liability based on intentional 
acts would allow Truck to deny coverage, while a determination of negligence 
would obligate it to indemnify the defendants.276 
Truck sought advice regarding DeMay’s request from Lance LaBelle of the 
Berger, Kahn law firm.277 LaBelle communicated with Chris Lundblad of 
Truck about modifying Truck’s original reservation of rights letter so as to al-
low Truck to control the defense of the arbitration, rather than having to accept 
independent counsel.278 Thereafter, LaBelle issued a superseding reservation of 
rights letter on Truck’s behalf that no longer reserved Truck’s right to deny 
coverage for liability premised on the defendants’ willful or intentional acts, 
but which still reserved Truck’s right to deny coverage for punitive damages.279 
This letter, when read together with the original reservation of rights letter and 
a separate letter from LaBelle to Lundblad regarding the plan to retain control 
of the defense, implicitly acknowledged Truck’s obligation to indemnify the 
defendants if they were held liable for willful misconduct.280 
The Shafers’ case went to arbitration and the arbitrators awarded them over 
$311,000 against all three defendants, and $25,000 against DeMay alone for 
fraud.281 A trial court affirmed the award and entered judgment for the Shaf-
ers.282 
Truck grudgingly paid $120,000 of the judgment.283 In a letter to the Shaf-
ers’ lawyer transmitting the check for that payment, LaBelle referred to the su-
perseding reservation of rights letter—although he did not include a copy of the 
letter—and asserted that California public policy precluded indemnity for 
fraud-related damages.284 In another letter to the Shafers’ lawyer, LaBelle em-
phasized that the arbitrators had found that the defendants had never intended 
to perform their contract with the Shafers and explained that the Truck policy 
did not cover property damage expected or intended by the insureds.285 Truck 
never fully satisfied the compensatory damage portion of the judgment.286 
Hanstad tried to discharge the judgment against him in bankruptcy but 
failed.287 He then successfully sued Truck for bad faith, represented by the 
Shafers’ lawyer.288 During discovery in the bad faith case, the Shafers’ lawyer 
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learned for the first time that Truck had agreed to indemnify Tri County, 
DeMay, and Hanstad against liability for willful acts.289 LaBelle, who was de-
posed in the bad faith case, acknowledged the agreement between Truck and 
the defendants in the underlying litigation.290 
Armed with this information, the Shafers sued Truck and LaBelle, as well 
as Berger, Kahn for fraud.291 LaBelle filed a demurrer, arguing that he had no 
duty to truthfully disclose the defendants’ insurance coverage to the Shafers 
and that the Shafers had not justifiably relied on any statements he made.292 The 
trial court granted the demurrer with leave to amend. The Shafers filed an 
amended complaint alleging fraud and conspiracy that read, in part, as follows: 
After the Shafers obtained a judgment against Truck’s insureds, LaBelle repre-
sented to the Shafers that Truck had not agreed to provide indemnity for willful 
acts. In fact, Truck had agreed to indemnification. While LaBelle and Truck 
knew that the statement about indemnity was false, the Shafers did not know of 
its falsity. LaBelle made the false statement with the intention of inducing the 
Shafers to forgo full payment on the judgment. The Shafers relied on LaBelle’s 
false statement, resulting in economic and noneconomic damages.293 
LaBelle again demurred, and this time the trial court sustained the demur-
rer without leave to amend and dismissed the case against LaBelle and his law 
firm.294 The Shafers appealed to the California Court of Appeal. 
On appeal, the Shafers contended that the trial court erred in dismissing 
their fraud claim. The appellate court agreed.295 In doing so, the court rejected 
LaBelle’s arguments that his statements about insurance coverage were not ac-
tionable because they were legal opinions, that he owed the Shafers’ no duty of 
truthfulness in any event, and that any claimed reliance on the Shafers’ part was 
unjustified.296 
It was clear to the court from the two reservation of rights letters and La-
Belle’s separate letter to Lundblad that Truck had agreed to indemnify Tri 
County, DeMay, and Hanstad against liability arising out of their willful acts to 
avoid paying for independent counsel for its insureds.297 Yet, to justify Truck’s 
payment of only $120,000 toward a judgment of approximately $336,000, La-
Belle directed the Shafers’ lawyer to the policy language precluding coverage 
for intentional acts and a California statute foreclosing insurance coverage for 
willful acts.298 “Thus, LaBelle allegedly misrepresented the scope of insurance 
                                                        
289  Id. 
290  Id. 
291  Id. (noting that the Shafers also sued Truck for breach of contract and bad faith). 
292  Id. 
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coverage” even though “[h]e had a duty not to make fraudulent statements.”299 
Under the circumstances, it was reasonably apparent that the Shafers would re-
gard LaBelle’s statements about insurance coverage as statements of fact rather 
than as legal opinions.300 Accordingly, the Shafers’ amended complaint ade-
quately pleaded that LaBelle had made fraudulent statements about Truck’s in-
surance coverage and that they reasonably viewed his statements as expressions 
of fact.301 
As for the reasonableness of the Shafers’ reliance on LaBelle’s statements 
regarding coverage, they had no reason to doubt him, and they had no reason to 
suspect Truck’s true coverage position, because they never received copies of 
either of Truck’s reservation of rights letters.302 In short, “the Shafers reasona-
bly relied on the coverage representations made by counsel for an insurance 
company.”303 Furthermore, LaBelle’s relationship with the Shafers was not that 
of an adversary or opponent, as the court explained: 
Under section 11580 [of the California Insurance Code], Truck had to pay the 
Shafers the amount of the judgment, subject to the terms . . . of the insurance 
policy, including any reservation of rights . . . . In that sense, the Shafers were to 
be treated as the insureds. Section 11580 “inure[s] to the benefit of any and eve-
ry person who might be negligently injured by the assured as completely as if 
such injured person had been specifically named in the policy.” And, as stated 
[earlier in the opinion], the Shafers were third party beneficiaries of the insur-
ance policy [because they were judgment creditors of the defendants].304 
Finally, LaBelle argued that the litigation privilege attached to his state-
ments about insurance coverage and accordingly rendered them non-
actionable.305 The court rejected LaBelle’s argument, reasoning that recogniz-
ing the litigation privilege would be inconsistent with section 11580 of the Cal-
ifornia Insurance Code, which empowers a party who obtains a judgment 
against an insured to sue the insurer as a judgment creditor to collect the judg-
ment.306 As interpreted by the California Supreme Court, that statute also 
makes a judgment creditor a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy on 
which it is suing, further indicating that the litigation privilege should not oper-
ate to defeat a judgment creditor’s exercise of its statutory right.307 Continuing, 
the court explained: 
                                                        
299  Id. 
300  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000)). 
301  Id. at 793. 
302  Id. 
303  Id. at 793–94. 
304  Id. at 794 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
305  Id. at 795. Generally speaking, the litigation privilege shields lawyers against liability 
based on communications made in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Id. 
306  Id. at 795–96. 
307  Id. at 796–97 (quoting Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584, 587–88 (Cal. 1976)). 
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Just as an insurer may be liable for defrauding its insured . . . so an insurer 
should not be allowed to deceive a third party beneficiary of an insurance policy. 
And if an insurer may be found liable to a third party beneficiary for fraud, so 
may its coverage counsel.  
Counsel retained by an insurer has an obligation to be truthful in describing 
insurance coverage to a third party beneficiary. The litigation privilege is not a 
license to deceive an injured party who steps into the shoes of an insured. Sec-
tion 11580 grants an injured party the right to file suit in order to recover under 
the insurance policy. Coverage counsel may not commit fraud in an attempt to 
defeat that right.308 
LaBelle’s litigation privilege argument was doomed from the outset for 
two additional reasons. One, it did not track any of the purposes underlying the 
litigation privilege.309 These include safeguarding witnesses and litigants from 
subsequent tort suits, ensuring open communications, promoting zealous repre-
sentation, obligating litigants to expose witnesses’ biases and false evidence, 
and enhancing the finality of judgments.310 Two, the litigation privilege gener-
ally does not protect a lawyer against liability for fraud.311 
After concluding that the Shafers could sue LaBelle for fraud and that the 
trial court erred in sustaining LaBelle’s demurrer without leave to amend,312 the 
Shafer court went on to hold that the Shafers could sue LaBelle for conspiring 
with Truck to defraud them.313 It therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment 
for LaBelle.314 
Although surely disappointing to LaBelle and his firm, the decision in 
Shafer was unsurprising. First, recall that the case reached the Shafer court on 
appeal from a demurrer, meaning that the court assumed all well-pleaded facts 
in the Shafers’ amended complaint to be true and applied a de novo standard of 
review to determine whether the amended complaint stated a cause of action.315 
Second, rather than being non-actionable legal opinions, LaBelle’s coverage 
statements were (1) under the circumstances, reasonably capable of construc-
tion as statements of fact;316 and (2) probably constituted “statements of law 
                                                        
308  Id. at 797 (citations omitted). 
309  Id. at 798. 
310  Id. 
311  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000)); N.Y. Cooling Towers, Inc. v. Goidel, 805 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (2005); Moss v. 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 285 P.3d 1157, 1166 (Utah 2012); Clark v. Druck-
man, 624 S.E.2d 864, 870 (W. Va. 2005). But see Dawley v. NF Energy Corp. of Am., 492 
F. App’x 77, 80 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying the absolute litigation privilege to fraud claims 
under Florida law); Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 892 (Conn. 2013) (stating that “attor-
neys are shielded by the litigation privilege from claims of fraud”). 
312  Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799. 
313  Id. at 801. 
314  Id. 
315  Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 2014) 
(quoting Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 2012)). 
316  Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 793. 
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that impl[ied] knowledge of facts,” which are actionable.317 Third, the court’s 
view was surely colored by LaBelle’s offensive attempt “to have his cake and 
eat it too.”318 After all, he formulated a strategy that created coverage for the 
Shafers’ claims to spare Truck independent counsel fees and then, to avoid the 
very obligation he created, turned full circle—knowingly exposing Truck’s in-
sureds to personal liability and deliberately impairing the Shafers’ statutory 
rights in the process. 
C. Third Party Reliance on a Lawyer’s Statements in a Real Estate 
Transaction 
Unlike Slotkin and Shafer, where the claims against the lawyers arose out 
of their conduct in connection with litigation, Petrillo v. Bachenberg319 arose 
out of a lawyer’s transactional practice. The Petrillo saga began in 1987, when 
Rohrer Construction wanted to sell a tract of undeveloped land in Union Town-
ship, New Jersey. Rohrer was represented by lawyer Bruce Herrigel.320 Rohrer 
hired Heritage Consulting Engineers to conduct percolation tests on the land in 
connection with a planned sale of the property to Land Resources Corp.321 Un-
ion Township required two successful percolation tests to approve a septic sys-
tem.322 Unfortunately for Rohrer, Heritage’s first report in September 1987 re-
vealed that only one of the twenty-two tests was successful.323 A second report 
issued in November 1987 showed that of eight tests conducted in the prior 
month, only one succeeded.324 In other words, of the thirty tests that Heritage 
conducted over the course of two months, twenty-eight were unsuccessful and 
only two were successful.325 This suggested that the two successful tests were 
anomalies and did not reflect the property’s true soil profile, and therefore that 
the property was not suitable for a septic system.326 Rohrer’s contract to sell the 
property to Land Resources thus fell through.327  
Rohrer then listed the property for sale with a real estate broker, 
Bachenberg & Bachenberg, Inc.328 In October 1988, William Bachenberg 
                                                        
317  Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 372–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 
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(“Bachenberg”) asked Herrigel for information about the property.329 In re-
sponse, Herrigel told Bachenberg that “he had some perc results,” and sent him 
a two-page document that consisted of one page from each of the two reports 
Heritage prepared for Rohrer.330 The first page was the first page of Heritage’s 
initial report, which reflected one successful test and five failed tests.331 The se-
cond page was taken from Heritage’s second report; it reflected one successful 
and one failed test.332 Herrigel’s “composite report” thus appeared to reflect a 
single series of seven percolation tests with two successful tests, rather than the 
true result: thirty tests with only two successful tests, an indication the property 
was a poor candidate for a septic system.333 Bachenberg & Bachenberg includ-
ed Herrigel’s composite report in its sales literature.334 Herrigel would later 
admit that he had complete copies of both Heritage reports but that he instead 
gave Bachenberg the composite report.335 
In December 1988, Bachenberg and a partner, John Matthews, bought the 
property at a sheriff’s sale for $70,000.336 Bachenberg asked Rohrer for a copy 
of Heritage’s percolation test reports soon thereafter, but Rohrer refused to 
share them because Bachenberg would not reimburse him for the cost of Herit-
age’s engineering fees.337  
Bachenberg later listed the property for sale at a price of $160,000.338 In 
February 1989, Lisa Petrillo inquired about purchasing the property to build 
and operate a childcare facility.339 Bachenberg gave her a copy of the composite 
report during their first meeting.340  
In June 1989, Petrillo agreed to buy the property for $160,000.341 Herrigel 
represented Bachenberg in the sale.342 Herrigel did not tell Petrillo’s lawyer that 
the composite report omitted numerous test results.343 At the insistence of Pe-
trillo’s lawyer, the sales contract gave Petrillo forty-five days to perform inde-
pendent soil and water tests on the property, including percolation tests. The 
                                                        
329  Id. 
330  Id. 
331  Id. 
332  Id. 
333  Id. 
334  Id. 
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contract further provided that she could rescind the deal if the percolation tests 
were unsatisfactory to her.344 
In August 1989, an engineering firm working for Petrillo performed six un-
successful percolation tests on the property and concluded that it was unsuita-
ble for a septic system.345 Petrillo promptly informed Bachenberg that their 
sales contract was null and void.346  
In response, Bachenberg hired Heritage to design a septic system that 
would satisfy the Township, but Petrillo refused to accept the design.347 Petrillo 
asked for time to conduct additional percolation tests, but Bachenberg declined 
her request.348 During these ongoing negotiations, Herrigel sent Petrillo the 
complete copies of the Heritage reports prepared for Rohrer.349 Bachenberg and 
Petrillo never could resolve their differences. 
When Bachenberg refused to return Petrillo’s $16,000 down payment on 
the theory that she had breached their contract, she sued him, Matthews, and 
Herrigel for the return of her down payment and the cost of her engineering 
fees.350 She alleged that the defendants were guilty of breach of contract, fraud, 
concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy.351 With respect to 
Herrigel, she alleged that his failure to timely provide her with the complete 
Heritage reports breached a duty he owed her.352 Petrillo claimed that had she 
known that the property had passed only two of the thirty percolation tests, she 
never would have contracted to buy the land or hired engineering firms to un-
dertake site work.353  
The case went to trial, and at the close of the plaintiff’s case the trial court 
directed a verdict for Herrigel, reasoning that he owed Petrillo no duties.354 
Losing her remaining claims either on motion or by way of defense verdict, Pe-
trillo appealed.355 
The appellate court reversed the dismissal of Petrillo’s negligent misrepre-
sentation claim against Herrigel. The court reasoned that a jury could have 
found that when Herrigel gave Bachenberg the composite report, “Herrigel 
should have known that Bachenberg would provide the report to a prospective 
purchaser, such as Petrillo, who would rely on the report in deciding whether to 
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purchase the property.”356 Herrigel then sought review by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court.357 
The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that whether a lawyer may be 
held to owe a duty to a non-client requires a balancing of the lawyer’s duty to 
vigorously represent his client with “the duty not to provide misleading infor-
mation on which third parties foreseeably will rely.”358 When courts extend 
lawyers’ duties to third parties, they typically do so where the lawyer intended 
that a third party would rely on the lawyer’s work or should have foreseen that 
possibility.359 The court explained that preparation of legal opinion letters is an 
archetypal example of lawyer conduct giving rise to third-party liability be-
cause a legal opinion letter is intended to induce reliance by others, but the 
preparation of other types of documents and other sales-related activities can 
also expose lawyers to third-party liability.360 The court also recognized that 
lawyers may owe a duty of care to non-clients when they know or reasonably 
should know that non-clients will rely on their representations and the non-
clients are not too remote from the lawyers to deserve protection.361 Indeed, that 
is the negligent misrepresentation regime expressed in section 552 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.362 
Although Herrigel did not prepare an opinion letter, he extracted infor-
mation from the Heritage test reports, created the composite report, and gave 
the composite report to Bachenberg.363 The court’s initial task, therefore, was to 
determine the purpose of the composite report.364 
It was possible that Herrigel may have intended the composite report to re-
flect only that the property had passed two percolation tests.365 But Herrigel’s 
subjective intent did not control the court’s analysis; rather, the objective mean-
ing of the composite report was the relevant factor.366 In assessing the report’s 
objective meaning, the court was influenced by the parties’ roles.367 Herrigel 
was a lawyer who, in connection with his client’s efforts to sell the property, 
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delivered the composite report to a real estate broker.368 The court inferred that 
when Herrigel gave the composite report to Bachenberg, he knew, or should 
have known, that Bachenberg might share it with prospective purchasers of the 
property.369 Even so, Herrigel did nothing to limit prospective purchasers’ fore-
seeable use of the report.370 He never indicated in the composite report or a 
cover letter that the report was incomplete or might be considered inaccurate 
because it did not reflect all percolation test results.371 
After Bachenberg purchased the property from Rohrer, Herrigel represent-
ed him in connection with the aborted sale of the property to Petrillo.372 “Al-
though compiling an engineering report to help a client sell real estate may not 
be part of a lawyer’s stock-in-trade,” the court observed, “representing the sell-
er of real estate is a traditional legal service.”373 Herrigel’s continuing involve-
ment as a lawyer in the transfer of the property permitted the court to infer “that 
the objective purpose of the [composite] report was to induce a prospective 
purchaser to buy the property.”374 His continuing involvement supported the 
further inference that he knew Bachenberg intended to use the composite report 
to assure prospective buyers of the property’s suitability for a septic system.375 
A prospective buyer reading the composite report reasonably could believe 
that the property had passed two of seven percolation tests rather than two of 
thirty.376 And, based on that conclusion, a person might agree to buy the proper-
ty when she would never do so if she had seen the complete set of percolation 
test reports.377 In the court’s view, Herrigel should have foreseen that scenar-
io.378 In summary, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that the composite 
report misrepresented material facts.379 
By giving Bachenberg the composite report and thereafter representing him 
in the contested sale of the property to Petrillo, “Herrigel assumed a duty to Pe-
trillo to provide reliable information regarding the percolation tests.”380 He 
“controlled the risk that the composite report would mislead a purchaser” of the 
property.381 It was therefore fair for Herrigel to shoulder the risk of loss result-
ing from the delivery of a misleading report.382 As the court summarized: 
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Herrigel easily could have limited his liability. Most simply, he could have sent 
complete copies of both [Heritage] reports to Bachenberg. Alternatively, Her-
rigel could have sent a letter to Bachenberg stating that the property had passed 
two successful percolation tests as required by Union Township. Or he could 
have stated either in a letter to Bachenberg or in the composite report that the re-
port evidenced only that the property had yielded two successful percolation 
tests and that no one should rely on the report for any other purpose. Because 
Herrigel did nothing to limit the objective purpose of the composite report, he 
should have foreseen that Petrillo, as a prospective purchaser, would rely on the 
facts set forth in the report. Accordingly, Herrigel’s duty extend[ed] to Petrillo. 
Given Petrillo’s concern about percolation . . . Herrigel’s duty include[d] the ob-
ligation to provide information about unsuccessful, as well as successful, perco-
lation tests.383 
The court was careful to note that its decision did not preclude a jury from 
finding in Herrigel’s favor.384 It was possible that a jury might find that Petrillo 
only cared that the property had passed two percolation tests, or that the omis-
sion of the many unsuccessful tests from the composite report was neither ma-
terial nor misleading; those were all factual issues to be resolved on remand.385 
The Petrillo court decided only that a jury should be allowed to “determine . . . 
the effect of Herrigel’s alleged negligent misrepresentation.”386 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the lower appellate 
court.387 
A dissenting justice argued that Herrigel’s preparation of the composite re-
port was nothing like the preparation of a legal opinion where, in the latter case, 
the authoring lawyer intends to induce reliance by third parties.388 The dissent-
ing justice’s essential concern was that the majority effectively was imposing 
on lawyers “an overbroad, virtually unlimited duty of care for remote non-
clients.”389  
Had he sent the composite report to Bachenberg while representing Rohrer 
and then had no further dealings with Bachenberg, Herrigel might have been 
able to argue that any potential liability to third parties would have been too at-
tenuated to recognize.390 But those weren’t the facts. Herrigel represented 
Bachenberg in selling the property to Petrillo.391 In furthering that sale, 
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Bachenberg gave the composite report to Petrillo.392 On those facts, a jury 
could conclude that Herrigel should have foreseen that Petrillo would receive a 
copy of the composite report and that she would detrimentally rely on it.393 Be-
cause of the discrete facts on which the court’s holding rested, a concurring jus-
tice reasoned that the likelihood that the court’s decision would materially af-
fect lawyers’ potential liability to third parties was “minimal indeed.”394 As the 
majority also noted in blunting the dissent, the holding went “no further than to 
state that Herrigel had a duty not to misrepresent negligently the contents of a 
material document on which he knew others would rely to their financial detri-
ment.”395 As the court further explained, “[i]n many situations, lawyers, like 
people generally, may not have a duty to act, but when they act, like other peo-
ple, they should act carefully.”396 
In hindsight, it is interesting that Herrigel gave Petrillo complete copies of 
the two Heritage reports.397 But he did so after Bachenberg had given her the 
composite report as part of a sales packet.398 Reading between the lines, those 
facts suggest that Herrigel had not anticipated that Bachenberg would give Pe-
trillo the composite report. The problem for Herrigel was that he arguably 
should have known that Bachenberg would give the composite report to Pe-
trillo, and that was enough to get the case to a jury.399 It was irrelevant that Her-
rigel did not know Petrillo’s identity when he delivered the document to 
Bachenberg; it is sufficient for purposes of identifying a plaintiff to whom a du-
ty may be owed “that the maker [of an alleged misrepresentation] supplies the 
information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that the 
plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker had never heard of 
[her] by name when the information was given.”400 
D. The Dean Foods Opinion Controversy 
The Petrillo court referred to opinion practice as an area in which lawyers’ 
potential liability to third parties was well established.401 By way of foundation, 
at the closing of a business transaction, the lawyer for the company often deliv-
ers to the opposing party—be it an acquiring company, an investor, or a lend-
er—a closing opinion.402 The closing opinion is in fact a letter that sets forth, in 
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a series of numbered paragraphs, the lawyer’s legal opinions on issues that the 
recipient asked to be addressed.403 It is common for one of the paragraphs to 
address legal proceedings involving the company.404 That paragraph does not 
actually state a legal opinion; rather, it states the fact that the lawyer knows of 
no legal proceedings other than those that have been disclosed to the recipi-
ent.405 This confirmation or statement of fact in a closing opinion is often de-
scribed as a “no-litigation opinion.”406 It is with that background that we arrive 
at Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi.407  
Dean Foods arose out of the acquisition by Garelick Farms, Inc., a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Dean Foods, of all of the outstanding stock of Scangas 
Bros. Holding, Inc. (“SBHI”).408 For simplicity’s sake, we’ll refer to the acquir-
ing company as Dean Foods. At the time of the acquisition, West Lynn Cream-
ery, Inc. (“WLC”) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of SBHI.409 The law firm of 
Rubin & Rudman had represented SBHI and WLC for several years and served 
as their counsel in connection with the Dean Foods deal, as well as the events 
that would give rise to this litigation.410 Michael Altman, Gene Barton, and 
Charles Speleotis were the principal partners at Rubin & Rudman involved in 
SBHI’s and WLC’s representation at the time of the events at issue.411 
In early October 1997, WLC received a federal grand jury subpoena con-
cerning payments it made to Michael and Cathy Gavriel, who owned Dunkin’ 
Donut franchises that were WLC customers.412 WLC hired Rubin & Rudman to 
represent it in regard to the subpoena.413 Altman assumed responsibility for the 
representation and, two weeks later, delivered responsive documents to the As-
sistant United States Attorney leading the investigation, John Hodgens.414 
Hodgens informed Altman that the government considered WLC’s response to 
the subpoena to be incomplete and thus expected a records custodian to appear 
before the grand jury. Accordingly, Altman interviewed various WLC employ-
ees, spoke with counsel representing other parties named in the subpoena, and 
advised Speleotis of the status of the matter.415  
In the course of his investigation, Altman learned that the government in-
quiry might involve tax evasion by parties other than WLC, facilitated by 
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WLC’s payment of “rebates” intended to ensure that other vendors did not 
place their dairy products in WLC’s coolers in Dunkin’ Donuts stores.416 A 
WLC employee testified before the grand jury in late November 1997.417 From 
Altman’s perspective, however, the matter went dormant after early December 
1997.418 The government made no further document requests, no WLC em-
ployees were called to appear before the grand jury, and Altman had no further 
contact with Hodgens or lawyers for other parties.419 
Beginning in late 1997 and continuing into 1998, Dean Foods talked with 
the SBHI shareholders about a stock acquisition of SBHI and, indirectly, 
WLC.420 These discussions faltered at least once, in part as a result of internal 
dissention within the ranks of the putative sellers, all of whom were family 
members with a history of acrimony.421 Ultimately, in June 1998, Dean Foods 
agreed to acquire all of the stock of SBHI (and thus WLC) pursuant to a stock 
purchase agreement with the SBHI shareholders.422 The selling shareholders 
represented to Dean Foods in the agreement that: 
Except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the Company Disclosure Schedule, there 
is no claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding, arbitration or investigation of any 
kind, at law or in equity (including actions or proceedings seeking injunctive re-
lief), pending or, to the Company’s knowledge, threatened against the Company 
or any of its subsidiaries, and neither the Company or any of its subsidiaries is 
subject to any continuing order of, consent decree, settlement agreement or other 
similar written agreement with, or continuing investigation by, any Governmen-
tal Entity, or any judgment, order, writ, injunction, decree or award of any Gov-
ernmental Entity or arbitrator, including, without limitation, cease-and-desist or 
other orders.423 
Prior to the execution of the stock purchase agreement, Barton and Speleo-
tis met with Arthur Pappathanasi, an SBHI shareholder who represented the 
other selling shareholders in the transaction.424 They advised him that the pru-
dent course would be to list the grand jury investigation as on-going litigation 
on Schedule 2.10 to the stock purchase agreement.425 Barton and Speleotis pro-
vided this advice even though Altman advised them in the meeting that he had 
heard nothing from Hodgens for six months and that based on other tax evasion 
cases he had handled, it was his “guesstimate” that the matter “had probably 
gone away.”426 Pappathanasi declined to follow Barton’s and Speleotis’ advice, 
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because he feared that it would reignite dissention among the disagreeable fam-
ily members who were the selling shareholders and interfere with the sale.427 
Accordingly, Schedule 2.10, as delivered to Dean Foods, did not mention the 
grand jury investigation.428 
The stock purchase agreement also required the SBHI shareholders to de-
liver an opinion letter to Dean Foods.429 Thus, as part of the closing of the sale 
on June 30, 1998, Rubin & Rudman delivered an opinion letter that included 
the following paragraph: 
To our knowledge, except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the Company Disclo-
sure Schedule, there is no claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding, arbitration 
or, [sic] investigation of any kind, at law or in equity (including actions or pro-
ceedings seeking injunctive relief), pending or threatened against the Company 
or any of its subsidiaries and neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries is 
subject to any continuing . . . investigation by, any Governmental Entity . . . .430  
The closing opinion also stated that, while Rubin & Rudman had relied on the 
factual representations in the stock purchase agreement and had not conducted 
an independent investigation into any factual matters, “nothing ha[d] come to 
[its] attention which cause[d] [it] to doubt the accuracy” of the schedules to the 
stock purchase agreement.431 
In September 1998, following Dean Foods’ acquisition of SBHI’s stock 
and, indirectly, WLC, the federal investigation of WLC resurfaced with a 
vengeance.432 In March 2001, WLC agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States by impeding the IRS’s collection of taxes and paid a 
$7.2 million fine.433 WLC also incurred $2.1 million in defense costs.434 Dean 
Foods thereafter sued the selling shareholders and Rubin & Rudman in Massa-
chusetts state court, alleging that it would not have agreed to buy WLC had it 
known of the grand jury investigation.435 
Dean Foods settled with the SBHI shareholders on undisclosed terms, but 
its case against Rubin & Rudman went to a bench trial.436 Following that trial, 
the court issued a somewhat disjointed opinion in which it stated: 
The Rubin and Rudman defendants did not conduct the inquiry that they were 
required to make by customary practice. The confirmation they gave, grounded 
as it was on errors of fact, created for the recipients the comfort that an ongoing 
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investigation did not exist and that nothing had come to the attention of Rubin 
and Rudman that cast doubt about the accuracy of that report.437 
The court noted that even a modest inquiry by Altman in June 1998 would 
have revealed that the government investigation was ongoing.438 The court 
found that Rubin & Rudman committed negligent misrepresentation in giving 
the opinion on the basis of such inadequate investigation.439 The court further 
held that Dean Foods had a right to rely upon the flawed no-litigation opin-
ion.440 Dean Foods unquestionably was among a limited group of people or en-
tities for “whose benefit and guidance Rubin & Rudman” supplied the infor-
mation in the closing opinion.441 Rubin & Rudman intended for Dean Foods to 
rely on the opinion letter as the language of the letter made clear.442 Further-
more, the opinion letter was a condition of the sale closing, it was delivered at 
the closing, and the deal closed.443 In the end, the court awarded Dean Foods 
damages of approximately $9.3 million, which represented the sum of the fine 
assessed against WLC plus the costs that WLC incurred in defending the crimi-
nal case, all of which were ultimately borne by Dean Foods as a result of its ac-
quisition of WLC.444 
CONCLUSION 
Few lawyers think themselves to be at risk for liability based on fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation arising out of clients’ representations. This per-
spective probably rests at least in part on common notions of litigation practice, 
where parties generally cannot base fraud or misrepresentation claims on op-
posing lawyers’ statements. But lawyers may be sued for fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation by adversaries in litigation in some cases, as where, for ex-
ample, they knowingly misrepresent material facts in negotiations. Given the 
nature of transactional practice, business lawyers are natural targets of fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation claims by counter-parties based on alleged 
false statements and failures to disclose information. For that matter, clients 
may sue their own lawyers for alleged fraud in appropriate cases. In fact, fraud 
and misrepresentation are common theories of liability in suits against lawyers 
by both clients and third parties. The question then becomes what lawyers 
should do to mitigate the risk of related liability. Advice to be honest is a bro-
mide. 
Transactional lawyers should generally advocate to clients full disclosure 
whenever known facts are arguably responsive to other parties’ requests for in-
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formation. This almost certainly is lawyers’ duty under applicable rules of pro-
fessional conduct,445 and regardless, it is invariably in clients’ interests to do so. 
If a client resists disclosing a matter potentially material to a transaction when 
there is no principled basis to do so, a lawyer should try to persuade the client 
to change her mind. If that effort fails, the lawyer may need to consider with-
drawing from the representation. Depending on the facts, a lawyer may wish to 
consider withdrawing from the representation even where the client has an un-
derstandable basis for its reticence, as Pappathanasi seemingly did in the Dean 
Foods case. 
Transactional lawyers offering any sort of opinions should be careful to 
confine their opinions to the subjects specified by the client or third party.446 
They should also consider qualifying opinions and statements to third parties in 
appropriate matters. Consider, for example, the prudence of the law firm in 
Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert LLP,447 which was alleged by lenders to have 
misrepresented in an opinion letter that “loan documents were duly executed 
and delivered and the loan was a valid and binding obligation” on a realty com-
pany and New York lawyer turned notorious fraudster Marc Dreier.448 Dreier 
supplied the documents and information to the law firm necessary for prepara-
tion of the opinion—all of which were forged or falsified.449 Beyond the fact 
that the firm had no reason to suspect that the documents Dreier provided as the 
basis for the opinion were illegitimate, the opinion the firm provided to the 
lenders “was clearly and unequivocally circumscribed by the qualifications that 
[the law firm] assumed the genuineness of all signatures and the authenticity of 
the documents, made no independent inquiry into the accuracy of the factual 
representations . . . and undertook no independent investigation in ascertaining 
those facts.”450 Thus, and because the opinion letter by its terms only stated le-
gal conclusions, the law firm’s statements in the opinion letter were not action-
able as misrepresentations.451  
Business lawyers may wish to consider limiting their potential liability to 
those who might rely on their opinions or representations in appropriate mat-
ters. Such limitations are generally permissible under rules of professional con-
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duct,452 although commercial realities frequently prevent lawyers from seeking 
such protections. 
For trial lawyers, the threat of liability to third parties for negligent misrep-
resentation or fraud is greatest when requested to disclose the existence or 
amount of liability insurance potentially available to satisfy a judgment or to 
fund a potential settlement. Lawyers cannot knowingly misrepresent either the 
existence or amount of insurance coverage.453 If they do not want to reveal ei-
ther the existence or amount of insurance coverage for some strategic reason, 
they should simply decline to do so. If they are uncertain about the existence or 
amount of insurance coverage when asked about the subject and they are either 
required to reveal the information or wish to do so, they should obtain the nec-
essary confirmations before making related commitments or statements. 
In summary, all lawyers, regardless of practice area, must appreciate that 
they are potential targets of fraud and misrepresentation claims by clients and 
third parties. The need for care in lawyers’ communications is constant. 
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